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Larry Backer opines that ‘Most of the academic work regarding the "lessons" offered by American 
federalism for the European Union ("EU") and other supra-national systems has predominantly 
focused on an understanding of post-Civil War American federalism. It remains, on that account, 
extremely superficial.’  Backer notes that there are important lessons to learn from Calhoun’s 
marginalized understanding of federalism that provide emerging supra-national unions like the 
European Union  with a powerful conceptual foundation for the construction of non-national 
federal systems of government. The research question seeks to test this debate, first by following 
the theoretical arguments that took place within the United States on the issue surrounding states’ 
rights versus federalism, and second through the various court cases that have occurred within the 
European national courts and the European Court of Justice. In essence, the research question seeks 
to determine where the locus of power currently resides, or will tend to reside, between to the 
European Union and its member nations.  
 
Introduction  
Larry Cata Baker opines that ‘Most of the academic work regarding the "lessons" 
offered by American federalism for the European Union ("EU") and other supra-national 
systems has predominantly focused on an understanding of post-Civil War American 
federalism. It remains, on that account, extremely superficial.’  He argues that there are 
many lessons to be learned by the arguments set forth by pre-Civil War states-rights 
advocates, particularly those of John C. Calhoun. Calhoun’s marginalized understanding of 
federalism provides an alternative vision of the possibilities of federal organization for 
emerging supra-national unions, the most important of which is the European Union. This 
vision can provide a powerful conceptual foundation for the construction of non-national 
federal systems of government.  
 Although the great debate about federalism ended abruptly after the Civil War and 
the US emerged with a strong, centralized government, this debate is re-emerging 
throughout Europe and the political future of the European Union and other supra-national 
systems will likely be based on a different resolution. As such, it is important to understand 
the possibilities inherent in this alternative resolution and seek to reconsider the 
previously accepted ‘truths’ about the relationship of supra-nationalism to federalism, and 
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a more sophisticated understanding of the possibilities of federalism in domestic and 
international law. These different theories of multi-state association may prove forward-
looking in the twenty-first century world of small, ethnically homogenous communities and 
large, pluralistic super-unions.  
As evidenced by the Maastricht Treaty and Lisbon Treaty preambles, Europe seeks 
to “create an even closer union among the peoples of Europe,” and “to continue the process 
of creating an even closer union among the peoples of Europe.” In other words, these 
preambles seek to form a federation similar to that of the United States, by attempting to 
further consolidate and centralize power. In contrast, many of the Member States of the 
European Union have shown resistance through their national and constitutional courts, ‘to 
this even closer union,’ as they wish to remain within a looser system of allied nation 
states. 
The research question seeks to test this debate, first by following the theoretical 
arguments that occurred within the United States on the issue surrounding states’ rights 
versus federalism, and second, through the various court cases that have occurred within 
the European national courts and the European Court of Justice. In essence, the research 
question seeks to determine where the locus of power currently resides, or will tend to 
reside, between the European Union and its member nations. Accordingly, the research 
question sets up as the null hypothesis that the European Union will develop into a federal 
institution united under a strong central government.  The alternative hypothesis posits 
that the locus of power will remain at the nation state level, concluding that national courts 
will remain the arbiter of European Union interpretation.  
At the outset this paper has to link the early debates within the United States on 
federalism and the current debates within the European Union.  Many would argue that 
this link is spurious, as US federalism is based on a constitution while the European Union 
has been established through a series of treaties.  Thus the paper will open with a set of 
arguments that clearly link the two. In short, the United States was founded by a group of 
sovereign and independent states, initially united under the Articles of Confederation. The 
Articles of Confederation failed, and these states subsequently signed the Constitution, 
creating the federal government. Similarly, the EU was established by a group of sovereign 
and independent Member States that signed the Treaties that created the European Union. 
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In both cases, a group of sovereign and independent states signed documents that led to 
the creation of a governing body. 
After establishing the link between the US Constitution and the treaty-based EU, this 
paper will discuss the manner in which the US veered  from this 'group of independent 
allied states’ through decisions made by the Marshall Court, which delegated the power to 
itself to interpret the Constitution, and significantly increased the power of the federal 
government. The court essentially transferred discretionary authority from the states to 
the federal government, turning the states into an appendage of the federal government. By 
controlling for this interpretation from the US Courts, the paper will be able to test the 
arguments through the EU Courts to see where the EU is likely to move: toward a closer, 
centralized federal union or towards a legal framework that places the locus of power 
squarely with the Member States.   
In light of the Supreme Court decisions, this paper will subsequently delve into the 
arguments set forth by Confederates like John Calhoun, Robert Hayne, and Thomas 
Jefferson, compared to Federalists like Alexander Hamilton and John Marshall.  
Confederates advocated states’ rights, nullification, and the belief that the United States 
was an association of states, each of which could nullify an act set forth by the central 
government if the state believed that the central government overstepped its boundaries. 
Federalists advocated for the supremacy of the central government and the United States 
Supreme Court over the individual state governments and state courts. There was a lively 
debate in the United States after Chief Justice John Marshall’s ruling in McCulloch v. 
Maryland until the US Civil War as to what form of federalism would be used. These 
arguments provide important lessons of American federalism and an alternative version to 
the way we currently conceive federalism and federal organizations.  
Additionally, this paper will focus on the path taken by the European Court of Justice 
to centralize and consolidate judicial power in Europe. The European Court of Justice has 
made attempts to federalize the European Union through a series of cases that have 
mirrored those that laid the federal foundation for the United States. Some of the national 
and constitutional courts have continuously held that their national constitutions and 
courts take precedence over ECJ decisions. In many cases, it is an issue of national identity 
and democratic legitimacy. The primary issue in the EU is centered on the supremacy of the 
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ECJ over the courts of the member states. Some of the national and constitutional courts 
have continuously held that their national constitutions and courts take precedence over 
ECJ decisions. In many cases, it is an issue of national identity and democratic legitimacy. 
These arguments reflect many of the arguments made by pre-US Civil War confederates 
that were rejected after the Civil War. Thus, this paper will analyze the foundational cases 
of the European Court of Justice and the response by the Member States’ national and 
constitutional courts, especially the cases that ruled on the implementing legislation of the 
Maastricht and Lisbon treaties to determine where the locus of power currently resides 





There has been scholarship on some of the individual areas covered in this thesis, 
but very little encompasses the topic in totality. As such, this literature review will discuss 
the previously written scholarship in relevant sections: literature on the state’s rights 
arguments; material that covers the foundational cases of the Supreme Court of the United 
States that expanded the Court’s power and influence; material that discusses the 
comparison between the European Court of Justice and the Supreme Court; material that 
analyzes the foundational cases for the European Court of Justice, and scholarship on the 
cases from the member state national courts. This thesis will also use as primary sources 
the cases from the relevant courts, the arguments made state’s rights politicians, relevant 
portions of the United States Constitution and the treaties of the European Union. 
This paper will predominantly use primary source materials to address the question 
presented. Some of the cases used in this thesis will address the judicially crafted 
policymaking that led to the form of federalism currently present in the United States. The 
United States Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Marshall, decided a series of cases that 
broadly expanded the powers of the Supreme Court of the United States and led to many of 
the debates between the confederates and the federalists.  These cases include Marbury v. 
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Madison1, McCulloch v. Maryland2, Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee3, and Cohens v. Virginia.4 
Similar decisions were later made by the European Court of Justice to consolidate power. 
This paper will also use the documents and arguments set forth by US political theorists 
that argued the state’s rights position. The pre-Civil War arguments that advocated for a 
confederate government are in the original documents written by Thomas Jefferson, James 
Madison, John Calhoun, Robert Hayne, and Spence Roane.  
The states-rights materials will help establish the link between the constitution-
based United States and the treaty-based EU. These arguments focus on the United States 
as a group of sovereign states that have delegated only certain powers to the federal 
government. Many of these theories are based on the fact that the United States was first 
established through the Articles of Confederation. Some of the early states-rights materials 
are in the Federalist Papers, a series of seventy-seven articles written by Alexander 
Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison. Madison was initially a loyal federalist, but 
eventually abandoned the Hamiltonian ideologies and became a staunch supporter of 
Jefferson, the nation’s fourth President. The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, written by 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison in response to the Alien and Sedition Act, also 
provide some of the early confederate arguments. These resolutions focus on the idea that 
the United States was to be interpreted as a pact between the states that delegated only 
certain powers to the general government, but reserved all others for the states.  
 Subsequently, John Calhoun, who served as a Senator from South Carolina and 
eventual Vice President under President Andrew Jackson, was one of the leading advocates 
for states' rights, limited government, nullification, free trade, and slavery. His ‘Disquisition 
on Government’5, ‘Fort Hill Address’6, ‘A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of 
the United States’7, and arguments presented before the US Senate provide significant 
insight into his political theory. The paper’s theoretical design will thus focus heavily on 
Calhoun’s arguments that general government acts as an agent of the Member States 
                                                          
1 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803) 
2 17 U.S. 316, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819) 
3 14 U.S. 304, 4 L. Ed. 97,1816 U.S. 333, 1 Wheat. 304. 
4 19 U.S. 6 Wheat. 264 264 (1821) 
5 Calhoun, J. C. and Cheek, H. L. 2007. A disquisition on government. South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press. 
6 Calhoun, J. C. 1960. The Fort Hill Address. Richmond]: Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government. 
7 Calhoun, J. C. and Cralle , R. K.     . A disquisition on government and a discourse on the constitution and government of 
the United States. New-York: D. Appleton and Co. 
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because the paper will demonstrate that   this is the direction in which the European Union 
is heading. In his Fort Hill address, Calhoun clarifies his position, asking, “[S]tripped of all 
its covering, the naked question is, whether ours is a federal or a consolidated government; 
a constitutional or absolute one; a government resting ultimately on the solid basis of the 
sovereignty of the States, or on the unrestricted will of a majority; a form of government, as 
in all other unlimited ones, in which injustice violence, and the force must ultimately 
prevail.”8 
The Webster-Hayne debates, which occurred on January 19-27, 1830 between 
Massachusetts Senator Daniel Webster and South Carolina Senator Robert Hayne, provide 
further explanation of the confederate’s position.  The debates were initially on the subject 
of protectionist tariffs, but evolved into a battle over where the locus of power existed – in 
either the states or through individuals –, and South Carolina’s nullification crisis. Hayne 
argued  “I see as you do, and with the deepest affliction, the rapid strides with which the 
federal branch of our Government is advancing towards the usurpation of all the rights 
reserved to the States, and the consolidation in itself of all powers, foreign and domestic, 
and that too by constructions which leave no limits to their powers.”9  Senator Hayne 
proved an inadequate match for Senator Webster, as Webster’s second reply to Hayne is 
often referred to as "the most eloquent speech ever delivered in Congress."10 Webster was 
an exceedingly competent jurist and one of the most astute constitutional lawyers of his 
time. He represented the plaintiffs in front of the Supreme Court in many of the 
foundational cases.11 His description of the U.S. government as the people's Constitution, 
the people's government, made for the people, made by the people, and answerable to the 
people," was later used by Abraham Lincoln in the Gettysburg Address.  
Many scholars have written on the impact of the arguments set forth by states’-
rights traditionalists, particularly those of John Calhoun. Backer examines the way in which 
Calhoun’s theories of federalism can provide new insight on the European debate over the 
nature of the European Union. In exploring Calhoun’s arguments, Backer notes that 
according to Calhoun, government provides a means of social order in a community and the 
                                                          
8 The Fort hill Address: on the relations of the states and federal government  
9 Hayne, 86.  
10 Allan Nevins, Ordeal of the Union" (1947) 1:288 
11 James McCulloch in McCulloch v Madison, the Cohens in Cohens v. Virginia, and Thomas Gibbons in Gibbons v. Ogden.  
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ideal government balances between power and liberty.12 The article thoroughly explains 
Calhoun’s theories of concurrent majority and nullification, as delineated in his Disquisition 
on Government. He cites numerous examples in Calhoun’s speeches and writings that 
exemplify Calhoun’s belief that the US Constitution is a compact between sovereign states 
that created a relationship of principal and agent between the states and the federal 
government.13 The article later attempts to link Calhoun’s arguments with decisions made 
by the German Federal Constitutional Court.  
C.E. Merriam examines the political theory upon which Calhoun bases his theories of 
nullification, secession, and slavery.14 Merriam describes Calhoun as one of the strongest 
American political theorists in the first half of the nineteenth century and explains the 
difference between positive power, which makes the government, and negative power, 
which makes the constitution.15 Similarly, Alexander Tabarrok and Tyler Cowen trace 
Calhoun’s theories from a public choice perspective.16 Their article thoroughly examines 
Calhoun’s Disquisition on Government, and Calhoun’s theory that men are driven by self-
interest and will always seek to benefit themselves over what is best for their country. Men 
are, by nature, self-interested creatures, but must also live in a social state. As such, men 
need a controlling force – a government. However, although government is needed, it too 
has a strong tendency to abuse its powers because self-interest is ubiquitous. The authors 
further focus on Calhoun’s arguments for a concurrent majority and nullification.17  
 
In Judge Spencer Roane of Virginia: Champion of States’ Rights Foe of John Marshall18, 
the author sets forth many of the arguments made by Judge Spence Roane, one of the key 
political and judicial leaders in the state of Virginia. As the title indicates, Judge Roane was 
a significant opponent to Chief Justice Marshall and decided the Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee 
case in the Virginia State Supreme Court. He defied Chief Justice Marshall by holding that 
                                                          
12 Backer, 184.  
13 Backer, 189, citing Calhoun, A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States  
14 Merriam, C. 1902. The Political Theory of Calhoun. The American Journal of Sociology, 7 (5), pp. 577--594. 
15 Merriam, 582 
16 Tabarrok, A. and Cowen, T. 1992. The Public Choice Theory of John C. Calhoun. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift f\"ur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, pp. 655--674. 
17 Id. 659-660.  
18 Judge Spencer Roane of Virginia: Champion of States’ Rights Foe of John Marshall.  9  . Harvard Law Review, 66 (7), 
pp. 1242-1259. Available at: http://www.jstor.org./stable/1336940 [Accessed: 15/07/2013]. 
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the United States Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction over the Virginia State Supreme 
Court. The article explains Judge Roane’s position and his opposition to the Marshall Court.  
Kent Newmyer’s article, John Marshall, McCulloch v. Maryland, and the States’ Rights 
Tradition details Judge Roane’s and Judge William Brockenbrough’s efforts to disrepute 
Marshall’s ruling in McCulloch v. Maryland, which held that Congress may enact laws that 
are necessary and proper to carry out their enumerated powers, and that the United States 
Constitution is the supreme law of the land and state laws cannot interfere with federal 
laws enacted within the scope of the Constitution.19 While the previous article focuses on 
Judge Roane’s position, Newmyer focuses on Marshall’s arguments. He juxtaposes Marshall 
against the position of the entire state of Virginia and argues that the decision in McCulloch 
placed the Supreme Court at the center of a political storm.20 
A number of articles examine how and why we can compare the United States Supreme 
Court and the European Court of Justice. In using the arguments surrounding the decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court in its foundational years, it is important to understand 
why comparing the two courts holds relevance. Pavone argues that a comparative analysis 
of the ECJ and the US Supreme Court falls squarely within the domain of political science. 
He explains the policymaking role of both courts by examining the foundational cases and 
argues that their lawmaking function “is a result of the polycentric diffusion of political 
power that characterizes both the EU and the US systems of governance.” Pavone concludes 
that while the Supreme Court’s authority is most consequential horizontally, meaning 
between the people and the Court, the ECJ’s political power is vertically oriented, affecting 
the relationship between states and supranational EU institutions. This article highlights 
the difference in the present form of federalism in the United States and further 
emphasizes that one must examine the pre-civil war arguments as a backdrop to 
understanding where the locus of power exists in the European Union.  
Rosenfield compares constitutional review by the European Court of Justice and the U.S 
Supreme Court and argues that while the U.S. Supreme Court is vulnerable to internal 
forces, the European Court of Justice is vulnerable to external forces, specifically 
                                                          
19 Newmyer, K. 2000. John Marshall, McCulloch v. Maryland, and the Southern States Rights Tradition. John Marshall Law 
Review, 33 pp. 875-934. [Accessed: 26 Oct 2013]. 
20 Id, 833 
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constitutional courts in Member States.21 He argues that both courts have politicized their 
governing documents, citing Bush v. Gore in the US, which essentially decided the results of 
a presidential election. The article also traces many of the foundational cases from both 
courts and argues that the fate of the ECJ is not nearly as secure as that of the Supreme 
Court. Rosenfeld, however, focuses his arguments on the current status of the Supreme 
Court and fails to take into consideration the effectiveness of the arguments that occurred 
during Marshall’s time as Chief Justice. According to Rosenfeld, judicial supremacy is 
constitutionally ground in the United States, but judicially grounded in the ECJ. However, 
one could also argue that we perceive judicial supremacy in the United States as 
constitutionally grounded due to the Marshall’s arguments and the length of time that has 
passed since his ruling.  
 Mary Volcansek traces the trajectories of judicial power in the EU and the USA.22 
While the Supreme Court’s trajectory has wavered in terms of expanding and limiting its 
own power, the ECJ has thus far remained on course in expanding its own power. Her work 
argues that state sovereignty is a political theme in Europe, but that is becoming 
increasingly less salient as the EU further integrates. She traces the expansion of ECJ 
control, but does not examine the reaction by member state courts.  
The European Court of Justice has played a key role in European integration. Many 
sources explain the significance of the foundational cases of the European Court of Justice. 
These cases – Van Gend en Loos, Costa v ENEL, Frankovich v. Italy – widened the scope of 
European integration and parallel the foundational cases from the Supreme Court. Some 
argue that it has surpassed the original intent for the ECJ set forth in the Treaty of Rome.   
Henkel argues that the ECJ remains a driving force behind the development of 
constitutionalism of the European Union and that it has played the most dominant and 
consistent role in the integration process.23 He examines how the ECJ used principles of 
direct applicability, direct effect, and supremacy to usurp power from Member States.  
                                                          
21 Rosenfeld, M. 2006. Comparing constitutional review by the European Court of Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court. 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, 4 (4), pp. 618-651. [Accessed: 28 Oct 2013]. 
22 Volcansek, M. L., 2005. Judicially Crafted Federalism: EU and USA, EUSA Review 21(1): 23-31 
23 Henkel, C. 2000. Constitutionalism of the European Union: Judicial Legislation and Political Decision-Making by the 
European Court of Justice. Wis. Int'l LJ, 19 p. 153. 
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Some scholars have written on the manner in which Member States have been 
convinced to abide by ECJ rulings. Mark Pollack analyzes the differences in arguments 
between the inter-governmentalist approach, where “the ECJ as the agent of the Member 
States, on a short leash,” and the neofunctionalist view as presenting the Court as “a more 
independent and sophisticated strategic actor.”24 Pollack conducted a study that aimed to 
analyze the factors that determine the autonomy of agents. Similarly, Bier provides a 
constructivist analysis on how the ECJ ‘taught’ Member States to accept its jurisdiction in 
areas traditionally reserved to sovereign states. 
In examining how the ECJ came to such prominence, Alter argues that judges and 
politicians have fundamentally different time horizons, which translated into different 
preferences for judges and politicians regarding the outcomes of individual cases. This 
approach has been dubbed the ‘legal autonomy approach’ or neo-functionalist approach. 
Member States intended to create a court that could not significantly compromise national 
sovereignty or national interest, but the ECJ changed the EU legal system, fundamentally 
undermining Member States’ control over the court. By playing off the shorter time 
horizons of politicians, the ECJ developed legal doctrine and thus constructed the 
institutional building blocks of its own power and authority without provoking political 
response. Transformation of the European legal system by the ECJ subsequently limited 
possible responses of national governments to its decision in the domestic political realm.25  
Where Alter and Henkel note the ECJ’s influence and power over European Integration, 
Garrett uses principle-agent analysis to explain how the ECJ is merely an agent of the 
Member States, otherwise known as the ‘political power’ or inter-governmentalist 
approach. He argues that the ECJ serves an important, yet limited role in the EU political 
process and is politically constrained by Member States. Member States delegated 
authority to the ECJ for the purpose of monitoring compliance with EU obligations. His 
model predicts that a member state will disregard adverse rulings depending on the 
potential harm, and that when such disregard is likely to occur by a powerful member 
state, the ECJ will avoid ruling against that state in the first place. 
                                                          
24 Pollack 1997, 57 
25 Alter, K. 1998. Who Are the" Masters of the Treaty"?: European Governments and the European Court of Justice. 
International Organization, 52 pp. 121--148. 
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 Alter is critical of Garrett’s work and argues that it attributes to the ECJ certain roles 
that rightfully belong to the European Commission, and it misses the main role the Member 
States wanted the ECJ to play in the EU political system: keeping the Commission from 
exceeding its authority.26 Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie Slaughter are also critical of 
Garrett’s theories, claiming that Garrett’s theory “distorts the ECJ's decision-making 
process beyond recognition.” Like Alter, they argue that during the formative years, the 
court was able to override Member States’ individual preferences and impose significant 
constraints on the ability of a state to fight back. Judges have their own idea for Europe and 
interpreted the Treaty of Rome as requiring deeper integration than specified by Member 
States preferences. The court's ability to advance its own agenda depended on how 
convincingly it "speaks as the technical and apparently nonpolitical voice of 'the law'." 
 
Although this paper uses cases decided by Member States’ national and 
constitutional courts as primary sources, previous authors have dedicated themselves 
towards analyzing many of these cases. There is a significant amount of literature that 
focuses on Germany, as there has been an array of cases decided by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court relevant to the relationship between the Member State’s courts and 
the European Court of Justice. E.R. Lanier focuses on the FCC’s decisions in the Solange I 
and Solange II cases. The author focuses on the differences between these two rulings 
where in the former, the FCC held that the ECJ’s protection of fundamental rights was not 
strong enough to meet the guarantees of fundamental rights found in the German 
constitution. German constitutional guarantees would override any EC law to the contrary 
of these guarantees in Germany. However, in Solange II, the FCC slightly changed its course 
in ruling that the level of fundamental rights protection had risen in the European 
Community so that it met the requirements of the German Constitution. If there was a 
conflict between EC law and German law, German law would not automatically supersede 
the EC law. He argues that the ruling in Solange II “effectively knitted the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities into the judicial fabric of the Federal Republic of Germany…” 
                                                          
26 Garrett, G., Kelemen, R. and Schulz, H. 1998. The European Court of Justice, national governments, and legal integration 
in the European Union. International Organization, 52 (1), pp. 149--176. 
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However, as Lanier’s article was written in  9  , it is unable to take into account the later 
rulings on the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties.  
 Dieter Grimm examines the Maastricht decision, and its importance for European 
integration and the applicable constitutional issues and arguments.27 He conducts an 
analysis of the relationship between the national legal orders and their European 
Community counterparts, as well as between constitutional courts and lower national 
courts by examining the potential implications of the FCC’s Maastricht decision. Moull also 
analyzes the Maastricht decision. He argues that the main area of interest in the judgment 
deals with the issues of democracy and competences.28 Moull specifically addresses the 
democracy principle in the German Constitution.  
Steve Boom also analyzes Germany’s Maastricht decision, but specifically links the 
FCCs decision on the Maastricht Treaty with arguments from pre-Civil War Virginia 
politicians. He argues that the consolidation of federal power underlays both the 
Maastricht decision and the legal and political battle during the foundational years.29 The 
German FCC paralleled many of the arguments made by Virginia legislators in response to 
the McCulloch case, which vastly expanded the ECJ’s powers when it invoked the ‘necessary 
and proper’ clause of the US constitution. This led to the intense debates over the powers of 
the federal government. Boom argues that the German FCC took similar issue against the 
ECJ’s permissive stance toward the institutional use of article 2   to expand EU 
competences.30  
 The most recent work on Germany’s response to the ECJ addresses the FCC’s ruling 
on the Treaty of Lisbon. Christian Wohlfahrt provides a descriptive analysis of the Lisbon 
case. His work emphasizes the boundaries of integration set forth by the FCC under 
                                                          
27 Grimm, D. 1996. European Court of Justice and National Courts: The German Constitutional Perspective after the 
Maastricht Decision, The. Colum. J. Eur. L., 3 p. 229. 
28 Moull, D. 2004. Lessons the EU should learn from the formative years of the US: Challenges to EU authority in the areas 
of legitimacy and interpretive competence and the implications for the conceptualization of the EU. Jean Monnet Working 
Papers in Comparative and International Politics, (51), pp. 1-21. Available at: 
http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/jmwp51.pdf [Accessed: 6 Feb 2014],  at 8. 
29 Steve J. Boom, “The European Union after the Maastricht Decision: Will Germany Be the "Virginia of Europe?" The 
American Journal of Comparative Law Vol. 43, No. 2 (Spring, 1995), pp. 177-226, at 206 
30 Boom, 204. Article 2   states, “If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the 
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary 
powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European  
Parliament, take the appropriate Measures.” Treaty of the European Union.  
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German law.31 It also provides a comparison with the Maastricht case, where the court 
concentrated on the different mechanisms that might safeguard the competences of the 
German courts. Frank Schrokopf argues that the Lisbon case is much more far sighted in its 
reasoning and legal approach than the Maastricht decision, and that Germany’s 
participation in European integration will be examined through the German constitution’s 
provisions for international law.32 Schrokopf focuses on the court’s analysis of electoral 
democracy as a form of legitimization and the premise of constitutional identity and 
highlights the case’s differentiation between primary and secondary political areas. Under 
Schrokopf’s analysis, the Basic law views the European Union as an association of 
sovereign states that can only become a primary political area if the respective will has 
been developed by the citizens. Armin Steinbach focuses on the scope and content of the 
core competencies that the FCC reserved for the German government. The FCC held that 
cultural diversity, multilingualism, and heterogeneity of values are obstacles to deeper 
European integration. Steinbach refutes this and notes that other Member States do not 
view them as obstacles towards integration. Elisabetta Lanza also examines the Lisbon 
decision and focuses on the subject matters reserved to Member State jurisdictions, but 
targets her paper toward understanding the EU’s identity and potential solutions to the 
democratic deficit in the EU.33 Her analysis comes to a similar conclusion, that the EU 
remains a secondary political area under certain principles of democracy.  
 Many scholars examine other Member States’ national courts. Oreste Pollicino 
focuses on Central and Eastern European Courts, specifically Hungary, Germany, Poland 
and the Czech Republic.34 He investigates the trends that focus on the relationship between 
international judicial legal orders.  He uses the European Arrest Warrant as a case study to 
examine the reactions of some CEE Constitutional Courts to the challenges brought on by 
European enlargement.. Rafael Lea-Arcas discusses the Spanish Constitutional Court’s 
                                                          
31 Wohlfahrt, C. 2009. The Lisbon Case: A Critical Summary. German Law Journal, 10 (08), pp. 1277-1285. [Accessed: 29 
Oct 2013]. 
32 Schorkopf, F. 2009. The European Union as An Association of Sovereign States: Karlsruhe's Ruling on the Treaty of 
Lisbon. German Law Journal, 10 (08), pp. 1219-1240, 1220 
33 Lanza, E. 2013. Core of State Sovereignty and Boundaries of European Union's Identity in the Lissabon-Urteil. German 
Law Journal, 11 (04), pp. 399-418. [Accessed: 29 Oct 2013]. 
34  Pollicino, O. 2010. The New Relationship between National and the European Courts after the Enlargement of Europe: 
Towards a Unitary Theory of Jurisprudential Supranational Law?. Yearbook of European Law, 29 (1), pp. 65-111. Available 
from: doi: 10.1093/yel/29.1.65. 
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relationship with the European Court of Justice, and how a potential conflict would be 
resolved. He uses a series of cases, which establish that national authorities are not 
‘Community’ organs, even when applying community law. Instead, national courts are 
permanently tied to the Constitution.35 His article concludes that the existing conflict 
between EC law and Spanish legislation does not have constitutional relevance. While EC 
law is not subject to Constitutional review, the implementing legislation is, and can thus be 
used to circumvent community law.  
 This paper will use the states’ rights arguments as a theoretical framework to assess 
the locus of power in the European Union by examining national and constitutional court 
cases. This paper will test Larry Cata Baker’s hypothesis that Calhoun’s political theory is 
an alternative view of federalism, which is more appropriate for supranational institutions 
like the European Union.  Previous scholars have examined certain elements of this 
argument, but this paper will trace the argument from the foundation of the United States 
to current arguments on the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
Chapter 1- The American  Transformation 
Baker proposes that we reexamine our understanding of federalism, especially as it 
relates to supra-national institutions like the European Union. Since the end of the Civil 
War, the discussion of federal “states” has been confined to the limits of the American 
situation. By examining the states’ rights arguments posited by theorists like John Calhoun 
and James Madison, one can create a link and establish the conceptual framework that 
allows for the comparison between the early stages of the United States and the current 
position of the European Union. This link is found in both the history of the formation of 
the United States and through many of the confederate and states’ rights arguments that 
were silenced after the Civil War. Baker notes that the intellectual community has “falsely 
assumed the unchanging nature of American federalism” and is critical of the dismissal of 
America’s early foundations as “substantially irrelevant.” This paper argues that the 
historical genesis of American federalism is rooted in the notion that the United States was 
initially envisioned as a group of loosely allied states. These states eventually signed the US 
                                                          
35Leal-Arcas, R. 2005. Reception of European Community Law in Spain, The. Hanse L. Rev., 1 p. 18. 
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Constitution, but many of the founding fathers signed under the guise of independent, 
sovereign states, creating a governing body to which only limited powers were designated. 
The United States eventually veered off this path into our current understanding of a 
federal government.  
The United States of America was established as a confederation in 1781 upon the 
signing of The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union.36 The document outlined the 
original intent for the United States, most importantly that “each state retains its 
sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is 
not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United states, in Congress 
assembled.”37 The thirteen original states entered into “a firm league of friendship with 
each other, for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and 
general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other…”38 These provisions demonstrate 
that the United States was originally organized as an alliance of friendly, but sovereign 
states that delegated a limited set of powers to a general government. The union closely 
resembled an international organization, comprised of unreliable signatory states. The 
Articles of Confederation, however, proved too weak, due in part to Congress’s lack of 
enforcement power, inability to collect taxes, and lack of ability to regulate foreign trade 
and interstate commerce.39  
Alexander Hamilton initially proposed the idea for a stronger centralized 
government. Hamilton, along with John Jay and James Madison penned The Federalist 
Papers40, a series of eighty-five articles and essays, in an attempt to encourage their 
colleagues to ratify the Constitution. Federalist No. 11, written by Hamilton, encapsulates 
the way in which we currently understand American federalism. It states, "Let the thirteen 
States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one great 
                                                          
36 The document was signed in 1777 by the 13 founding fathers, but only became effecting in 1781 when Maryland, the 
final state, ratified the document. Jensen, Merrill (1959). The Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation of the Social-
Constitutional History of the American Revolution, 1774–1781. University of Wisconsin Press. pp. xi, 184. 
37 Avalon.law.yale.edu. 2013. Avalon Project - Articles of Confederation : March 1, 1781. [online] Available at: 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/artconf.asp [Accessed: 18 Nov 2013]. (Article 2) 
38 Id., Article 3 
39 www.Learner.org. n.d. The New Nation. [online] Available at: 
http://www.learner.org/courses/amerhistory/pdf/text/AmHst06_NewNation.pdf [Accessed: 5 Feb 2014]. 
40 Hamilton, A., Madison, J., Jay, J. and Goldman, L. 2008. The Federalist papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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American system, superior to the control of all trans-Atlantic force or influence and able to 
dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world!"41 The Articles of 
Confederation were abandoned, and the United States Constitution was written in 1787 
and officially ratified in 1790. Despite its federalist nature, confederate advocates remained 
strong, particularly in the American south.  
Once the Constitution became effective, the argument became whether it was a 
compact between the people of the United States, or in the alternative, a compact between 
individually sovereign states. The confederate arguments centered on the notion that the 
Constitution was a contract to which the states, bound together, are the principals while the 
general government acts as their agent. The federal government was created by the 
Constitution, but it was not an actual party to the agreement. Baker clarifies the 
confederate position, which argued that the federal constitution delegated certain 
sovereign powers to the federal government, but did not transfer sovereignty itself.42 In 
order to assert competencies not expressly delegated to it, the general government would 
need to seek an amendment to the Constitution, which would be granted by elected 
representatives from the states.  
The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, both written in 1798, provide some of the 
early arguments later used by John Calhoun in his nullification doctrine. Both resolutions 
were a response to the Alien and Sedition Act passed by Congress.43 The Kentucky 
Resolution, written by Thomas Jefferson set forth that:  
“the several States composing the United States of America are not united on the 
principle of unlimited submission to their general government; but that, by a 
compact under the style and title of a Constitution for the United States, and of 
amendments thereto, they constituted a general government for special purposes — 
delegated to that government certain definite powers, reserving, each State to itself, 
the residuary mass of right to their own self-government; and that whensoever the 
                                                          
41 Federalist no 11 
42 Baker, 189 
43 The Alien and Sedition Acts were created after an aftermath of the French Revolution. It increased residency 
requirements for American citizenship from five to fourteen years, subjected aliens deemed dangerous to the peace of the 
United States to imprisonment or deportation, and restricted speech critical of the Federal government. In reality, it was 
an attempt to decrease the  number of French and Irish voters, which usually favored Jeffersonian democrats. 
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general government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, 
and of no force.”44 
 It further declared that the Constitution was a compact to which the states acceded. 
The government was created by this compact and could not serve as the exclusive or final 
judge to the extent of powers delegated to it. To do so would make the governments 
discretion, and not the Constitution’s, the measure of its powers. Jefferson reasoned that 
each state has an equal right, as parties to the compact, to judge for itself.45 The Virginia 
Resolution, written by James Madison, made nearly identical arguments.46 The arguments 
made in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions would later be found in arguments made by 
the German Federal Constitutional Court in its ruling on the relationship between the 
European Court of Justice and the German government. 
 The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions establish the early foundations for many of 
the states’ rights arguments later made by John Calhoun, a slaveholding statesman from 
Virginia. In his Fort Hill Address, he reasoned that the government was formed by the 
people of distinct, sovereign political communities: 
"the General Government emanated from the people of the several states, forming 
distinct political communities, and acting in their separate and sovereign capacity, 
and not from all of the people forming one aggregate political community; that the 
Constitution of the United States is, in fact, a compact to which each State is a party, 
in the character already described; and that the several States, or parties have a 
right to judge of its infractions; and in case of a deliberate, palpable and dangerous 
exercise of power not delegated, they have the right, in the last resort, to use the 
language of the Virginia Resolutions, 'to interpose for arresting the progress of the 
evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and 
liberties appertaining to them."47 
He further noted that: 
“The General Government is but its creature; and though in reality a government, 
with all the rights and authority which belong to any other government, within the 
orbit of its power, it is nevertheless a government animating from a compact 
between sovereigns, and partaking in its nature and object, of the character of a 
                                                          
44 : Constitution.org. 2014. The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798. [online] Available at: 
http://www.constitution.org/cons/kent1798.htm [Accessed: 5 Feb 2014]. 
45 Id at note 42 
46 Constitution.org. 2014. Virginia Resolution of 1798. [online] Available at: 
http://www.constitution.org/cons/virg1798.htm [Accessed: 5 Feb 2014]. 
47 Calhoun, 1960 
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joint commission, appointed to superintend and administer the interests in which 
all are jointly concerned; but having, beyond its proper sphere, no more power than 
if it did not exist.”48 
 
Calhoun maintained that the Constitution was signed by the people of the States, 
each acting in its own convention and ratifying at different dates.49 Each signature to the 
Constitution represented an individual and sovereign act. Had the people of the United 
States agreed to the compact as one body politic, there would have been no need for each 
state to sign independently. He described the government as an assembly of diplomatists, 
convened to deliberate and determine how a league or treaty between their several 
sovereigns for certain defined purposes, shall be carried into execution, leaving to the 
parties themselves, to furnish their quota of means, and to cooperate in carrying out what 
may have been determined on.”50 Further, sovereignty is indivisible. Either the states or the 
union had to be subordinate. The general government may exercise sovereign powers, but 
is not actually sovereign.51  
 Foundationally, Calhoun argued that although the government is necessary to 
protect and preserve society, it is comprised of individuals and thus susceptible to human 
selfishness and abuses of power.52 The Constitution serves to strike a balance and keeps 
the government in check. Calhoun’s position theory revolves around the ideas of 
concurrent majority and the doctrine of nullification. The concurrent majority, as opposed 
to numerical majority, aimed to protect the minority opinion from the majority, which in 
this case referred to the southern states’ desire to protect slavery.  Under a concurrent 
majority, the minority has the right to veto potentially hostile legislation.53 He feared that 
the general government, which represents the interests of the whole, may encroach on the 
State governments, which represent the local interests.54 
                                                          
48 Id, note 45 
49 Calhoun and Cralle ,      
50 Discourse, p 163 
51 Merriam 589 
52 Disquisition, 3-4 
53 As the northern states became industrialized, its population expanded. The south relied on an agrarian-based economy 
and its population growth stagnated. As such, the north had greater representation in government and was able to drive 
national policy. In order to protect the southern states, Calhoun zealously advocated for concurrent majority by 
geographic region. 
54 Foothill address 
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Perhaps what is most relevant to the European context however, is Calhoun’s theory 
of nullification. Under this doctrine, a state could nullify an act of the general government it 
deemed unconstitutional. Echoing the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, Calhoun believed 
that the individual states of the union have the right to reject any measure of the general 
government it regards as inconsistent with the Constitution.55  The states also have the 
right to recall the powers delegated to the central government. Calhoun believed that all 
governments need some sort of mechanism to reign in the government. While positive 
power is the power of acting, negative power prevents or arrests action, and that 
combining the two makes a constitutional government.  
 Calhoun was not alone is his argument. Robert Young Hayne, a South Carolina 
statesman who served as both a senator and governor, engaged in a fierce debate with 
Massachusetts statesman Daniel Webster. Webster was one of the most noted 
constitutional lawyers, served as a senator, a state representative, and as Secretary of State. 
The debate occurred in 1830 and was initially over a protectionist tariff on western land. 
Eventually, the debate turned to the South Carolina nullification crisis.56 Hayne, citing 
Madison, argued that the United States was formed by “the sanction of the States, given by 
each in its sovereign capacity.”57 Since the states were parties to the Constitutional 
compact, there could be no tribunal above their authority. He cited the Virginia and 
Kentucky resolutions, arguing that if those who administer the General Government be 
allowed to contravene the limits set by the Constitution, it would annihilate the rights of 
the State Governments and would consolidate too much power in a central government. 
Accordingly, the idea that the General Government is the exclusive judge of the extent of its 
own powers is nothing short of despotism since the discretion of those who administer the 
government, and not the Constitution would be the measure of their powers.58 He further 
claimed that “the several States who formed that instrument, being sovereign and 
independent, have the unquestionable right to judge of its construction, and that the 
                                                          
55 Merriam, 584 
56 South Carolina's 1832 Ordinance of Nullification. This ordinance declared by the power of the State that the federal 
Tariffs of 1828 and 1832 were unconstitutional and therefore null and void within the sovereign boundaries of South 
Carolina. 
57 Brooks, S. M. 2009. The Webster-Hayne debate. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America. See also Daniel Webster, The 
Webster-Hayne Debate on the Nature of the Constitution: Selected Documents, ed. Herman Belz (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
2000). Accessed from http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/1557 on 2014-02-05 
58 Kentucky Resolution of 1799 
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nullification by those sovereignties, of all unauthorized acts, done under color of that 
instrument, is the rightful remedy.” Finally, like his confederate colleagues, he argued that 
the powers of the federal government result from an agreement between the states and 
that the government must limit its actions to those expressly granted by the Constitution. 
Should the government exceed its delegated powers, the states maintain the right to 
intervene accordingly.59 
Summarizing the states’ rights arguments, the states are sovereign, but the 
government of the United States is not. The US Constitution created the federal government 
and it was to act as an agent or trustee of the states in specifically designated areas ordered 
by the Constitution. The United States was originally envisioned as a set of allied states that 
delegated certain powers, primarily the power to tax and direct foreign policy, while the 
State governments remained in control of all domestic matters. Thus, as a treaty created 
the European Union, signed by the member nations, so too was the United States created by 
an agreement between sovereign states. 
 The United States’ early years, and the debates between the confederates and the 
federalists provide the context for comparing the US and the EU. The signing of the 
Constitution correlates with the signing of the treaty that established the European Union. 
Before examining the EU, however, this paper will examine the way in which the United 
States deviated from this path. Many of the previously mentioned arguments were in 
response a series of cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS), 
which consolidated and expanded federal power. These cases, many of which were decided 
by Chief Justice John Marshall, transformed the United States from allied independent 
states that delegated certain powers to governing body, to a country with a strong central 
government where the states were left as dependents. The Supreme Courts’ early 
jurisprudence transferred discretionary power from the states to the federal government.  
Marbury v. Madison is perhaps one of the most important cases in US judicial 
history, as it immensely increased the scope of judicial power by establishing the principle 
of ‘judicial review’ and granting the Supreme Court the authority to void an act of Congress 
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deemed unconstitutional.60  It was a battle that displayed the political genius of two bitter 
rivals, Chief Justice John Marshall and President Thomas Jefferson. The elections of 1800 
resulted in the first transfer of power from the Hamiltonian Federalists to the Jeffersonian 
Republicans. The Jeffersonian Republicans won majorities in both the executive and 
legislative branches, leaving the judicial branch in the middle of the controversy.61 
Outgoing President John Adams made a series of ‘midnight appointments’ in an effort to 
stack the bench with Federalist judges. When President Jefferson took office, he 
surreptitiously convinced Congress to repeal the act that allowed the midnight 
appointments, terminating many of the newly created positions. 
One of President Adams’ ‘midnight appointments’, William Marbury, had been 
confirmed by the Senate, but his commission was not delivered before Adams left office. 
President Jefferson instructed Secretary of State James Madison, a former federalist, not to 
deliver the commission, therefore denying Marbury his position. Marbury petitioned the 
Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus under Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 178962, 
compelling Madison to deliver his commission.63 Justice Marshall held that Marbury had 
been wronged and deserved a remedy, but Section 13 violated Article III of the US 
Constitution because it extended to cases of original jurisdiction,64 which, according to 
Marshall, exceeded Congress’ authority.  Marshall voided a congressional act, creating the 
concept of judicial review. In his decision he stated “…the theory of every such government 
must be that an act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void […] So, if a law 
be in opposition to the Constitution, […] the Court must determine which of these 
conflicting rules governs in the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty […] that a 
                                                          
60 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803) 
61 Secretary of State John Marshall was nominated for the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The Senate 
quickly passed the Judiciary Act of 1801 which created sixteen new circuit court positions and reduced the number of 
Supreme Court positions by one. 
62 Loc.gov. 2014. Judiciary Act of 1789: Primary Documents of American History (Virtual Programs & Services, Library of 
Congress). [online] Available at: http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/judiciary.html [Accessed: 5 Feb 2014] 
63 SEC . 13. And be it further enacted, That the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a 
civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state and its citizens; and except also between a state and citizens 
of other states, or aliens, in which latter case it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction.…The Supreme Court shall 
also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after specially 
provided for; and shall have power to issue writs of prohibition to the district courts, when proceeding as courts of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to 
any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States. 
64 Original jurisdiction refers to the power to bring cases directly to the Supreme Court and under Article III, applied only 
to cases “affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls and to cases in which the state shall be a party.”  
Page 24 of 74 
 
law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are 
bound by that instrument.” Although legal scholars have debated Marshall’s interpretation 
of Article III,65 the importance of this case is undeniable. Marshall declared that it was the 
Supreme Court’s duty to review acts of congress, which infringe on the claim that reviewing 
acts for constitutionality was within the jurisdiction of state courts. It represents the 
creation of judicial policy making and the power of a court to strike down legislative acts. It 
placed the judiciary on par with the legislative and executive branches and provided a 
model of judicial review for future courts, like the European Court of Justice.  
The second of these cases was decided in 1812 and positioned the Virginia State 
Supreme Court against The United States Supreme Court and Virginia’s Judge Spencer 
Roane against the Chief Justice Marshall. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,66 which has been called 
the “Keystone of the whole arch of the federal judicial power”67 centered on whether the US 
Supreme Court could review state court decisions on issues of federal power. The case 
involved Virginia legislation from the American Revolution that allowed the state to 
confiscate property of American colonists that remained loyal to the British monarchy 
(Loyalists). The original suit was a  79  ‘action of ejectment’ against Lord Fairfax,  a British 
Loyalist. During the War, Virginia seized the land from Lord Fairfax and assigned part of it 
to David Hunter. After the war, the United States and Great Britain entered into a treaty 
guaranteeing the protection of lands owned by British Loyalists. Lord Fairfax’s nephew, 
Thomas Martin, inherited the land upon Fairfax’s death and sued in Virginia state court to 
recover the parcel assigned to Hunter. The court ruled in favor of Martin. Virginia’s highest 
court, the Court of Appeals, reversed the decision. Martin subsequently appealed to the U. S. 
Supreme Court, which reversed the decision once again, and held that the parcel in fact 
belonged to Martin pursuant to the treaty between the United States and Great Britain.  In 
essence, the U.S. Supreme Court commanded a state court to obey an order given by the 
Supreme Court. 
                                                          
65 See, for example Van Alstyne, William W.  969. “A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison.” Duke Law Journal.  969:  –47; 
Crosskey, William W. 1980. Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press; Currie, David P. 1985. The Constitution in the Supreme Court. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 
66 14 U.S. 304, 4 L. Ed. 97,1816 U.S. 333, 1 Wheat. 304 
67  Warren, C. 1926. The Supreme Court  in United States history. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 449 
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The Virginia Court of Appeals, however, repudiated the Supreme Court’s ruling 
arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court lacked the authority to review and overturn its 
decisions, that the U.S. Constitution did not provide for such a review, and that states had 
final say over federal laws in cases brought in state courts because states are independent 
governments in the federal system. The Virginia Court of Appeals argued that the Supreme 
Court had exceeded its jurisdiction. The judges unanimously agreed that the United States 
was comprised of a compact of states; sovereignty was divided and once a case was 
brought in a state court and not removed to a federal court, the state judiciary had an equal 
right with the federal judiciary to interpret the Constitution with finality.68 In his ruling, 
Judge Cabell argued “the belief, that [to give the federal government or one of its organs 
jurisdiction to operate directly and in a controlling manner upon the states] would produce 
evils greater than those of the occasional collisions which it would be designed to 
remedy.”69 Judge Cabell also reasoned that the principle of appellate review implied that 
the appellate tribunal was “superior” to the tribunal whose decisions it reviewed. Because 
the state and federal courts belonged in different and distinct systems, the Supreme Court 
could not be considered “superior” to a state court, but only to lower federal courts.70 Judge 
Cabell argued that the state courts were just as sovereign as the courts of foreign nations. 
 Judge Roane argued for the sovereignty of each individual state. As evidence, he 
cited the fact that each state called a special convention to ratify the Constitution by 
individuals elected from the population of these states. The Constitution was a contract 
between sovereign people in sovereign states. The purpose of the Constitution, therefore, 
was to limit the national government, not to strengthen and empower it, as he believed 
Marshall did in numerous rulings. Because states are sovereign, the cases of interpretation 
should go to the states and not the national government. The Constitution, therefore, gave 
the Court the power to decide cases between states, but not jurisdiction over its own 
controversies because doing so would make the national government the final judge in its 
own case.71 
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The case was once again appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that the 
Constitution did allow the Supreme Court to review state court decisions concerning 
federal laws. Justice Story72 represented Marshall’s philosophy in the Court and rejected 
the Virginia court’s argument, ruling that the Constitution did confer jurisdiction over 
decisions from state courts, that the Constitution was derived from the people and not from 
the states, and that the absolute right of decisions must rest with the Supreme Court. He 
contested the Virginia court’s statement that the United States was a compact of states, 
arguing that “the constitution of the United states was ordained and established, not by the 
states in their sovereign capacities, but emphatically, as the preamble of the constitution 
declares, by “the People of the United States.” Story further reasoned that the Constitution 
does not guarantee complete independence from the federal government. Not only did the 
Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress, it now had the authority to 
review state court decisions on federal power.73 This case represents yet another example 
of the Supreme Court deciding its own jurisdiction.  
A following case further polarized the nation and further divided the federalists and 
states’ rights advocates. McCulloch v. Maryland was the watershed case that established the 
principle of supremacy. At issue in this case was the constitutionality of an act of Congress 
that established the Second Bank of the United States.74 When state banks began to fail in 
1818 much of the blame was directed towards the Second Bank as an unfair competitor. 
Maryland enacted antagonistic legislation directly at the Bank of the United States that 
created a substantial tax on “any bank not chartered within the state.”75 The Bank of the 
United States was the only bank in Maryland not chartered within the state. When the 
Second Bank’s Baltimore branch refused to pay the tax, Maryland sued a cashier at the 
bank, James McCulloch, for collection of the debt. McCulloch argued that the tax was 
unconstitutional. Maryland won in both state court and at the court of appeals. McCulloch 
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1819 and was represented by Daniel Webster, from 
the previously mentioned Webster-Hayne debate. 
                                                          
72 Justice Marshall recused himself from the case due to a personal interest in the property in controversy 
73Boom, 186 
74 Under the act, the bank was the depository of federal funds and had the authority to issue notes that circulated as legal 
tender similar to the notes of states’ banks. In lieu of paying taxes, the Bank agreed to lend the federal government money. 
75 17 U.S. 316, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819) 
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The doctrine of implied powers, under the necessary and proper clause of the US 
Constitution was one of the major points of contention.76 Alexander Hamilton had 
previously argued that in order to accomplish the duties of a government, there must be an 
implied right to use means sufficient to its ends. The implied powers doctrine, where 
powers authorized by the Constitution are not explicitly stated, but are implied by those 
that are, and the growth of the northern majority posed a significant danger to the agrarian 
slave-owning south.77 If Congress could use implied powers that exceeded the enumerated 
powers via the “necessary and proper clause” and the northern interests continued to 
prevail, slavery could be abolished.  
 Chief Justice Marshall penned the opinion for the unanimous Supreme Court. He 
invoked the implied powers doctrine and held that the Bank of the United States was 
constitutional and the tax on the bank was unconstitutional. Marshall made three pivotal 
arguments that shaped federalism in the United States. First, under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause of Article 1, Section 8, Congress is expressly granted the power to pass laws 
“necessary and proper” for the performance of its “enumerated powers.” These 
enumerated powers include power to regulate interstate commerce, borrow money, and 
collect taxes. Accordingly, the creation of the Bank of the United States was related to 
Congress’ enumerated powers and was therefore constitutional.  Marshall also ruled that 
Maryland could not tax the bank because it lacked the power pursuant to the Supremacy 
Clause of Article VI of the Constitution. Under the Supremacy Cause, the laws of the United 
States are superior to conflicting state laws. By attempting to tax the Bank of the United 
States, Maryland was undermining superior institutions and laws of the United States.  
Finally, Marshall held that political authority of the Union lies with the people of the States, 
not the individual states that comprise it. He rejected the view that the United States was 
an alliance of states and that the authority rests with the people. Specifically, the Court 
ruled that "the government of the Union is a government of the people; it emanates from 
them; its powers are granted by them; and are to be exercised directly on them, and for 
their benefit.” Maryland’s attempts to tax the Bank of the United States equates to waging a 
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levy against all American citizens by a state only accountable to the people within its 
borders.  
 Reactions to Marshall’s rulings in Hunters, Marbury, and McCulloch were varied. 
Some states acquiesced and incorporated the rulings in future legislation. Other states, 
particularly Virginia, opposed and rejected the Supreme Court’s authority on three 
grounds. First, it was argued that states did not cede sovereignty to the federal 
government. As previously stated, they believed that states, as parties to the treaty, 
possessed the power to “decide for themselves, and each State for itself, whether, in a given 
case, the act of the general government transcends its power.”78 Second, they rejected the 
Supreme Court’s argument of the Supremacy Clause. The argument follows that although 
the Supreme Court has the authority to interpret the Constitution between the branches of 
the federal government, this authority does not extend “to questions which would amount 
to a subversion of the Constitution itself, by the usurpation of one contracting party or 
another.”79 Finally, in opposition to Marshall’s argument for the need of uniformity among 
the states, anti-nationalists believed that non-uniformity was inevitable because the US was 
comprised of a group of free and independent governments. 
In a series of scathing articles critical of Justice Marshall, Judge Roane proclaimed 
that the problem was “a renegade [sic] congress,” of “turn-coats and apostates.” He accused 
Justice Marshall of inciting “a judicial coup de main,” in McCulloch and gave future 
legislators “a general letter of attorney.”80 Roane felt that Marshall extolled Hamilton and 
supported his consolidationalist philosophy, believing him to be “the Alpha and Omega, the 
beginning and the end, the first and the last-of federal usurpations.” Roane felt that he was 
speaking for the people of Virginia and for the American forefathers.  
Re-examining Calhoun’s position on nullification against the backdrop of these 
cases, one can clearly see his opposition to the consolidation of power at the federal level. 
Calhoun argued that states were the primary units while the general government was 
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merely an agent. States should have independent judgment as to what is and is not 
constitutional and should be the final arbiters for constitutionality. However, after these 
foundational cases, power was transferred from the states to the general government, 
making state governments subordinate to the federal government. Marshall’s response to 
the states’ rights advocates simplifies the way in which we currently view American 
federalism. In responding to Judge Roane, he wrote; “In fact, the government of the union, 
as well as those of the states, is created by the people,… who administer it for their own 
good….The constitution has defined the powers of the government, and has established 
that division of power which its framers, and the American people, believed to be most 
conducive to the public happiness and the public liberty….” Marshall desired a system of 
duel federalism, which balanced the rights of the states with the rights of the national 
government. He summarized his constitutional philosophy:  
“[The Constitution] is not a contract between enemies seeking each other’s 
destruction, and anxious to insert every particular, lest a watchful adversary should 
take advantage of the omission. Nor is it a case where implications in favor of one 
man impair the vested rights of another. Nor is it a contract for a single object, 
everything relating to which, might be recollected and inserted. It is the act of a 
people, creating a government, without which they cannot exist as a people. The 
powers of this government are conferred for their own benefit, are essential to their 
own prosperity, and are to be exercised for their good, by persons chosen for that 
purpose by themselves…. It is intended to be a general system for all future times, to 
be adapted by those who administer it, to all future occasions that may come within 
its own view. From its nature, such an instrument can describe only the great 
objects it is intended to accomplish and state in general terms, the specific powers 
which are deemed necessary to those objects.”81 
The purpose of examining these foundational cases has been to come to an 
understanding of the path the United States took as it evolved from a confederation to its 
current federal union. In the early years, “states enjoyed more legitimacy than the general 
government, which was distant.”82 The general government gained legitimacy under 
leadership from Chief Justice John Marshall. The principles established by the Supreme 
Court transferred the locus of power from the states to the federal government. Studying 
these cases and the arguments that ensued sheds new light on the current debate in the 
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European Union.  As Baker notes, “Calhoun’s sensitivity to the tendency of independent 
supra-national entities to appropriate for themselves powers, which might not have been 
expressly delegated to them without the consent of their constituent parts, drove his 
construction of what has been the alternative vision of a federal union.”  The treaty that 
created the European Union, like the original foundation of the United States, was signed by 
a group of sovereign states, but through the decisions and actions by the governing bodies, 
most notably the European Court of Justice, has similarly transformed the European Union 




 The American debate over federalism ended with the conclusion of the Civil War, 
but has re-emerged in the European Union. Comparing the two courts is appropriate due to 
the amount of influence the Supreme Court had on the development of the foundational 
European Court of Justice jurisprudence. For example, Judge Pescatore, a distinguished 
member of the ECJ urged Europeans “to recognize that on many issue arising in a federal 
context the United States have the advantage of some 150 years of a highly diversified 
judicial development from which many useful lessons may be learned.”83 Baker contends 
that the governing organs of the European Community have taken up the American-
orthodox stance with the ECJ leading the way. The constitutional courts and national courts 
of certain Member States – most notably Germany and Italy – have championed Calhoun’s 
states’ rights arguments.84 The ECJ decided a series of cases that closely parallel the 
foundational cases decided by Justice Marshall and the US Supreme Court. These cases have 
transformed the Community from what Baker calls “a self-styled regional organization of 
sovereign states – to something else.” Indeed, these cases transformed the European Court 
of Justice from a weak institution with little enforcement capabilities, to one of the 
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strongest political actors in Europe, and the leading proponent of European integration. 
Like the Supreme Court, the ECJ conferred rights that were not granted in its governing 
document. The ECJ has, in a sense, attempted to federalize the European Union by asserting 
supremacy of Community law and granting individual citizens and lower courts the right to 
bypass their respective higher national and constitutional courts. This chapter will examine 
the cases that transformed the European Union, drawing comparisons to similar cases in 
the United States. 
 In 1952, the Treaty of Paris established the ECJ as part of the European Coal and 
Steel Community. Modeled after the French Conseil d’Etat, the ECJ was created to fulfill 
three limited roles: ensuring that the Commission and the Council of Ministers did not 
exceed their authority, filling in ambiguous aspects of EC laws through dispute resolution, 
and determining charges of noncompliance raised by the Commission or by Member 
States.85 In the European Coal and Steel Community, it was the Commission, not the ECJ 
that monitored contraventions of Community law. The ECJ originally served as an appellate 
body that heard challenges of Commission decisions. Under the Treaty of Rome, the 
Commission still monitored Treaty compliance, but lost the authority to unilaterally 
declare breaches of Treaty provisions and to levy fines.86 The Commission served as the 
primary monitor, but “the ECJ mediated Commission charges and Member States’ defense 
regarding alleged treaty breaches…only if the diplomatic efforts to secure compliance 
failed.”87 Despite its initial limited function, the ECJ has significantly expanded its judicial 
function. The ECJ’s history can be categorized into three periods. The first period 
encompasses its formation through the landmark cases of the 1960s, including the Van 
Gend en Loos88 and Costa cases and lasted until the early 1970s. Although many of the 
foundational cases were decided in this period, the ECJ remained a weak institution as few 
took notice of the potential ramifications of these decisions. The second period commenced 
at the end of the first and continued until the 1980s. During this period, the ECJ continued 
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to expand on its foundational cases. Combined, the first and second periods represent the 
ECJ’s transformation into a political actor. Alter explains the technique used as a well-
known judicial practice of expanding its jurisdictional authority by establishing legal 
principles, but not applying the principles to the cases under consideration.89 The third and 
final period started in the 1980s and continues to the present day. During this time, the 
ECJ’s area of control gradually expanded through treaty amendments including the Single 
European Act of 1986, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, the 2001 
Treaty of Nice, and the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon.90  
 The 1963 Van Gend en Loos91 case established the doctrine of direct effect and is 
one of the most important judgments decided by the ECJ. If direct effect is applicable to a 
provision of Community law, national courts must apply that provision as part of the law of 
the land.92  The Van Gend en Loos company imported urea-formaldehyde from West 
Germany to the Netherlands. It objected to the tariff imposed by Dutch Customs authorities 
on products imported from Germany and filed a complaint with the national court seeking 
a refund. Van Gend en Loos sought to apply Article 12 of the Treaty of Rome,93 which 
requires Member States to refrain from introducing between themselves any new customs 
duties on imports or exports against the Dutch customs authorities in proceedings in a 
Dutch tribunal. The case was referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling for a decision on 
whether Article 12 was directly effective.  
 The respondent argued that the obligations set forth in Article 12 were addressed 
to govern rights and obligations between States and did not confer rights to individuals. 
The Court ruled for the Van Gend en Loos company, citing  “the objective of the EEC treaty” 
and held that Article 12 contains an unconditional negative obligation and that the nature 
of the prohibition makes it “ideally adapted to produce direct effects in the legal 
relationship between Member States and their subjects.”94 The most quoted passage of the 
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case, however, tackles the notion that Member States have limited their sovereign rights. 
The ECJ stated: 
 [T]he Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit 
of which that states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, 
and the subject of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals. 
Independently of the legislation of the Member States, Community law therefore not 
only imposes obligations on individuals, but is also intended to confer upon them 
rights, which become part of their legal heritage.. 
This case reversed an internationally recognized public international law principal which 
presumes that international legal obligations apply only to states. According to Weiler, 
"Public international law typically allows the internal constitutional order of a state to 
determine the method and extent to which international obligations may, if at all, produce 
effects for individuals within the legal order of the state."95 Typically, even when 
international law or human rights obligations create state obligations or bestow rights on 
an individual, it does not create an actionable right in the national courts. Meaning, 
individuals cannot invoke international obligations in a national court. Under direct effect, 
Member States are subjected to individuals invoking Community obligations in their 
national courts.96 It created a direct relationship between the Community and the Member 
States’ citizens. Furthermore, EU law must be “fully and uniformly applied in all the 
Member States from the date of their entry into force for as long as they continue in 
force,”97 regardless of whether state law requires implementing legislation. The ECJ 
gradually expanded the rights of individuals under the principle of direct effect in 
subsequent cases. Initially, for a provision to be directly effective, it had to be clear and 
unambiguous, unconditional, and not dependent on further action being taken by EU or 
national authorities.98 However, in the 1974 case Van Duyn v Home Office,99 the ECJ held 
that direct effect also applied to directives. The Court later ruled that even when a directive 
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has not yet been incorporated into national law, domestic courts must interpret national 
law in light of the directive in question.100 
 What is equally noteworthy about this case is that the ECJ made its decision outside 
of the parameters of the Treaty of Rome. Like the Supreme Court did in Marbury v. Madson, 
the ECJ engaged in judicial policymaking in determining a foundational principle of 
Community law. Both courts argued that there are implied rights that are not necessarily 
specifically granted by treaty or constitution. In Marbury, Justice Marshall argued, 
“affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those 
affirmed; and in this case, a negative or exclusive sense must be given to them or they have 
no operation at all. It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to 
be without effect; and therefore such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words 
require it.”101 In Van Gend en Loos, the court rejected the argument that express remedies 
exclude the use of any other remedies. Both courts also base their ruling on the notion that 
a contradictory ruling would lead to an absurd result.102 
 With the passage of the Single European Act and a series of directives issued to 
finalize the internal market, the European Commission acted to address Member States’ 
improper or non-implementation of community directives. Many Member States refused to 
incorporate ECJ judgments and the ECJ used the Frankovich103 case to establish the doctrine 
of state liability. It concerned a claim that the Italian government’s failure to implement 
Community directive – the establishment of a wage guarantee fund – caused him damages 
when his employer filed for bankruptcy.104 Under Council Directive 80/987, Member States 
were required to establish guarantee funds from which employee wage claims might be 
paid in situations of employer bankruptcy. The complainants requested sums payable or 
damages for non-implementation of a directive. Under the then-existing understanding of 
direct effect, the employee was precluded from relief. The issue before the court hinged on 
whether a national court may be required under Community law to hold the State liable 
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where the failure to implement a directive which does not give rise to direct effect has 
harmed an individual.105 The Court ruled in favor of the claimant’s second request, holding 
that there is a general principle inherent in the Treaty that a Member State must 
compensate individuals for losses caused by a violation of Community law for which the 
Member State is responsible. Like its ruling in Van Gend en Loos, the Court based its 
reasoning on the idea that the principle exists because it is in the interests of the 
Community that it should exist.106 
One year after Van Gend en Loos, the ECJ established the doctrine of supremacy of 
Community law over national law. In Flamino Costa v. ENEL,107 an Italian citizen owned 
shares in an electricity company. He opposed the nationalization of the electricity sector in 
Italy and refused to pay his electricity bill in protest. The nationalized electricity company, 
ENEL, sued Costa for nonpayment. Costa argued that nationalizing the electricity sector 
violated both the Italian Constitution and the Treaty of Rome. The case was first referred to 
the Italian Constitutional Court and then to the European Court of Justice. The Italian 
Constitution Court ruled that although the Italian Constitution provided for the limitation 
of sovereignty, the latter of two conflicting statutes prevails. Because the nationalization 
law was signed in 1962 while the Treaty of Rome was incorporated into Italian law in 1958, 
the nationalization law must prevail over the Treaty. Further, the Italian government 
submitted to the ECJ that a preliminary rule would not serve any purpose because the ECJ 
did not have the power to set aside Italian law.108 
The ECJ disagreed with the Italian government, holding that “the transfer by the 
States from their domestic legal system to the Community legal system of the rights and 
obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their 
sovereign rights against which subsequent unilateral acts incompatible with the concept of 
the Community cannot prevail.”109 In a move similar to that of the United States Supreme 
Court in its Marbury ruling, the ECJ declared that although Community law remains 
supreme, the Italian law did not actually violate Community law. 
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It is this notion of the supremacy of EU law over national law that indicates a type of 
federal structure.110 Although the treaty that established the European Community did not 
have a specific supremacy clause similar to the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution, 
the ECJ determined that there is a hierarchical relationship in which EU law ranks higher 
than national law. The ECJ held that “integration into the laws of each Member State of 
provisions which derive from the Community, and more generally the terms and the spirit 
of the Treaty, make it impossible for the States, as a corollary, to accord precedence to a 
unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal system accepted by them on a basis of 
reciprocity. […] The executive force of Community law cannot carry from one state to 
another in deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardizing the attainment of 
the objectives of the Treaty set out in Article 5(2) (now Article 10) and giving rise to the 
discrimination prohibited by Article 7 (now Article 14). The law stemming from the Treaty, 
an independent source of law, could not, because of its special and original nature, be 
overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its 
character as Community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself being 
called into question.111 As such, EU law remains supreme over national law so long as the 
EU law falls within the competences of the EU and Member States are incapable of making 
laws with the intention of overriding EU law. 
The Court of Justice later asserted the principle of primacy in Amminstrazione delle 
Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal. In Simmenthal, the complainant challenged the 
inspection fee imposed by the Italian revenue authorities. Simmenthal argued that the fee 
violated the previously mentioned Article 12. During the preliminary hearing, the Italian 
government argued that issues of constitutionality were reserved for the Italian 
Constitutional Court. The ECJ disagreed, arguing that Community regulations are subject to 
direct effect and that “deferring taxpayer’s recovery until the Italian Constitutional Court 
acted would upset the uniform application of the regulation throughout the community.”112 
The Court held that “every national court must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply 
Community law in its entirety and protect rights which the latter confers on individuals 
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and must accordingly set aside any provision of national law which may conflict with it, 
whether prior or subsequent to the Community rule.”113 Accordingly, national courts must 
give full effect to relevant provisions without prior constitutional review. The 
constitutional procedures of Italy were not permitted to delay the consideration of the 
complainant’s case. This case will be re-analyzed from the Italian perspective in the 
following chapter to understand Italy’s opposition towards Community primacy.  
The McCulloch, Costa, and Simmenthal cases all concern the supremacy of federal 
law over state or Member State law. Backer argues that supremacy provides the definitive 
answer to the question of the status of the Community government relative to the states, 
which constitute the new government. Through these decisions, the ECJ attempted to 
impose on the constituent states of the Community review mechanisms which appear to 
mimic the American model.  Supremacy is critical in establishing the ideal of the 
universality of norms shared among communities. Harmonization within the European 
Union’s ‘new legal order’ is coercive. It suggests the limits of lawmaking to which the 
constituent states of the Community must adhere; it supplies the boundaries to delineate 
the conduct norms of the supranational polis. Harmonization regularizes and levels 
national differences.114 
Each of these cases also highlights the transfer of sovereignty to a somewhat 
centralized government. In both the United States and the EU, states are prevented from 
creating or enacting legislation that is incompatible with the federal structure. State courts 
in the United States and national courts in the European Union must also comply with 
rulings from the Supreme Court or the European Court of Justice. Weiler argues that it is 
the combination of direct effect and supremacy that truly highlights the federal nature of 
the EU. Under the two doctrines, Community norms that produce direct effect are "not 
merely the Law of the Land, but the "Higher Law" of the land. This architecture, with very 
few expectations, is only found in the internal constitutional order of a federal state.115 
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 The doctrines established by the European Court of Justice: supremacy, direct 
applicability, direct effect, implied powers, and primacy, clearly indicate the Court’s 
intention towards deeper European integration and centralized governance. These 
principles were not part of the Treaty of Rome. Rather, they were judicially created by the 
ECJ, which transformed the original preliminary ruling system from a system that allowed 
individuals to question Community law into a system that allows individuals to question 
national law.116 The ECJ's ruling on the supremacy of Community law challenged the notion 
that international law must be narrowly interpreted and closely follow the clear intent of 
the negotiating parties. These doctrines, however removed the ECJ from the realm of 
traditional principles of international law.  
 Alter discusses the groundbreaking judicial advocacy practiced by the ECJ, noting 
that "nowhere did the Treaty of Rome say that European citizens had a legal right to have 
the Treaty implemented; nowhere was it written that EC law was supreme to national law; 
and nowhere in the Treaty were national courts empowered to enforce EC law against their 
governments. There was also no national legal basis for courts to apply the supremacy of 
EC law."117 The ECJ summarily changed the role of the Court by declaring the doctrines of 
supremacy and direct effect. Given the responses from the national courts that will be 
explored in the following chapter, one must examine the way in which the ECJ was able to 
establish legal precedent, consolidate, and aggregate power with little political response. 
 Re-tracing the foundations of the European Court of Justice allows us to examine 
the manner in which the ECJ veered from one of the weakest Community institutions to a 
driving integrating force. In the United States, criticism of Marshall’s interpretation of 
federalism was anything but subtle. In the European Union, the ECJ was able to quietly 
commandeer authority with little fanfare until recent decades. The ECJ undermined the 
national law by invoking Community law in national courts. Alter argues that the ECJ was 
able to expand its judicial authority and establish legal precedent without creating 
controversy by introducing new doctrines gradually. In many of these cases, the ECJ 
established the principle, but did not apply it to the case being decided. 
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 Although this paper will examine at length the legal response from member state 
courts in the following chapter, it is important to first examine the political atmosphere 
that allowed for the expanded ability for the European Court of Justice to further integrate 
the European Community. The ECJ has largely been able to escape Member State control. 
As noted by the 1974 Financial Times article, “although the Court likes to pose modestly as 
‘the guardian of the Treaties’ it is in fact an uncontrolled authority generating law directly 
applicable in Common Market Member States and applying not only to EEC enterprises but 
also to those established outside the Community, as long as they have business interests 
within it.”118 Allowing individuals to bring cases directly to the ECJ removed the power 
from the national courts to determine which cases the ECJ would hear. Individuals “raised 
cases involving issues that member states considered to be the exclusive domain of 
national policy, such as the availability of educational grants to non-nationals, the 
publication by Irish student groups of a how-to guide to get an abortion in Britain, and the 
dismissal of employees by recently privatized forms.”119 Individuals received rights even 
when the national legislation wasn’t in compliance with Community law and states were 
incapable of ignoring ECJ decisions. 
 The ECJ expanded its power while minimizing the financial and political response. 
Until the 1980s ECJ decisions were mere ‘principles without reality and had little political 
effect.’120 For example, in the previously mentioned Costa case, the Court ruled that the 
Italian law was not in violation of Community law. As such, there was nothing the Italian 
politicians could protest, not comply with, or argue to overturn. There was nothing for the 
Italian courts to enforce. The ECJ was careful not to solicit a great deal of political action 
from national actors. Some argue that European politicians were simply not paying 
attention to ECJ decisions. In considering the tactics used by the ECJ to allay political 
response, Trevor Hartley commented on the common tactic used by the ECJ, explaining that 
the ECJ introduces a new doctrine gradually. It will first establish the doctrine, but not 
apply it. If there are not too many protests, it will be re-affirmed in later cases.121  
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 Although political objections were minimal, they were still present. Legal 
integration proceeded in spite of the objections raised by national politicians. In the late 
1970s and early 1980s, French, German, and British politicians began decrying ECJ 
decisions. Specifically, French Prime Minister Michel Debre, declared that “once again…the 
attitude of the Court [has led to an] usurpation of the sovereignty of the Member States.  
Some scholars argue that if national politicians were truly outraged with the ECJ, they 
would have taken action against the Court to counter its jurisprudence. However, Joseph 
Weiler argues that the largest advances in EC legal doctrine at both Community and 
national levels occurred while Member States were simultaneously minimizing 
supranational tendencies from the Treaty of Rome. Member States were re-asserting their 
sovereign rights. For example, shortly after supremacy of Community law was declared in 
 964, France commenced its ‘empty chair’ policy to block Community policy-making and 
the expansion of Commission authority. Further, the “Luxembourg Compromise” protected 
national sovereignty by national politicians agreeing to stop the advancement to qualified-
majority voting.122 While the ECJ was advancing principles of supremacy and direct effect 
in the 1970s, national politicians were blocking attempts to create a common market. 
National representatives also argued against interpreting community law in a way that 
would allow national courts to evaluate the compatibility of Community law and national 
law. 
  This chapter focused on the path taken by the European Court of Justice to turn the 
EU into a “United States of Europe.” The ECJ attempted to ‘federalize’ EU law, by creating a 
hierarchical nature where EU law is supreme over national law, by making Member States 
liable for not conforming to EU norms, and by creating a direct relationship between 
individuals in the Member States and the European Union. The ECJ engaged in judicial 
policy making, relying on implied powers, to enhance the importance of the Court, as the 
Supreme Court did in the United States.  Like the Hamiltonian federalists, the ECJ has 
attempted to position the locus of power at the supranational level. However, as evidenced 
by the case law examined in the following chapter, the National Courts in the Member 
States continue to resist. 
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Chapter 3 The Member States Respond  
National courts throughout the Member States have had varied responses to the 
ECJ’s efforts. For example, Belgium and Latvia have complied with little resistance.123 At the 
other end of the spectrum are Germany and Italy, which have consistently questioned the 
democratic legitimacy of the Union, making the issue both legal and political.  As the 
European Court of Justice has been a powerful force for integration, it follows that the 
courts in the Member States have professed the most opposition. Examining the cases from 
Member States’ national and constitutional courts provides an understanding of some of 
the states’ responses to the ECJ, and helps to determine where the locus of power exists in 
the European Union. Subsequently, this examination provides an understanding of the 
nature of federalism in the European Union and its prospects for a federal union from both 
the Community and national perspectives. Some of the national court responses mirror the 
same arguments made by Calhoun and his confederate colleagues – that the EU remains a 
group of aligned, but ultimately sovereign Member States. The lessons learned from the US 
Supreme Court becomes increasingly relevant, because many of the national courts mimic 
the arguments made by Calhoun and his confederate colleagues; that the Union is a group 
of allied, but ultimately sovereign states to which certain competencies cannot be 
transferred.  
A myriad of issues have arisen in the national courts of the Member States in 
response to the ECJ’s foundational cases. The doctrines of supremacy and direct effect have 
caused conflicts between Community and Member State laws, and raised many questions. 
One is the extent to which national courts will go to accept supremacy when EU law 
conflicts with constitutional law. Are states willing to amend national and constitutional 
norms for the sake of conformity to Community law? Another issue is the conceptual basis 
on which national courts base their decision on cases that involve the supremacy doctrine. 
Is it based on the acceptance of Community supremacy? A third issue is the question of 
which court has ultimate interpretive authority of EU law. Do the national courts, as 
representatives of the Member States, decide when the ECJ has exceeded its jurisdiction? In 
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the United States, the Supreme Court delegated to itself this power.  Can a national court 
declare EU law null and void if it conflicts with constitutional norms? Although the United 
States has settled many of these questions, these issues are not certain in the EU. One of the 
central themes present throughout the Member States is that national and constitutional 
courts maintain the right to review acts EU acts for constitutionality, like judicial review in 
the United States. Another theme rests on principles of democratic legitimacy and national 
sovereignty. This chapter provides a synopsis and analysis of the national courts’ 
responses, which will subsequently show where the locus of power exists within the EU.  
Italy 
The Italian Constitutional Court (ICC) has vacillated between acceptance and non-
acceptance of Community norms from the inception of the ECJ to the present day. Italy’s 
initial misgivings are evident as it was the Italian government that prompted many of the 
ECJ’s foundational cases, including Costa and Simmenthal. At a fundamental level, the ICC 
uses a dualist approach, where national and international norms are separated. 
International law does not become part of national law until it has been transformed and 
implemented into the national legislation.124 The ECJ takes a monist approach, where 
Community law and national laws are considered equal.125 The ICC serves a dual and 
somewhat competing role in Italy. It is tasked with both acting as the guardian of the Italian 
constitution while simultaneously fostering European integration. Italian jurisprudence has 
re-envisioned the notion of Community supremacy and, in a sense, brought it down from 
the supranational to the national level.  
As noted earlier, the ICC has wavered on its acceptance of Community supremacy 
and ECJ authority. In one set of cases, the ICC has accepted, albeit with some hesitation, the 
authority of the ECJ. In another set of cases, it has attempted to limit the ECJ’s authority. It 
is in this set of cases that the ICC has “incrementally enlarged its power to exercise judicial 
review when Community matters are involved.”126 The former focused on sovereignty 
where the latter set focused on democratic legitimacy. Re-examining some of the 
                                                          
124 Craig, 38 
125 Cartabia 
126 Cartabia, 176 
Page 43 of 74 
 
foundational cases from the Italian perspective highlights initial impediments of 
Community supremacy under Italian law. Italy’s path to acceptance began with the  964 
Costa case, in which the ICC asserted, “the relationship between Community and national 
norms was no different from the relationship between two national sources of law 
possessing the same binding authority.”127 Accordingly, the ICC ruled that where a national 
and Community law conflict, the most recent law prevails. This meant that the Italian 
parliament could pass a law contrary to Community law that would have higher authority 
in Italy making Italy uncommitted and unbound by any Community law. The ICC slightly 
adjusted its position ten years later, bringing more conformity with the ECJ, but still 
subjected Community law to judicial review, triggering the ECJ’s Simmenthal decision.  The 
ICC declared that when the ICC determines there is a conflict between national law and 
Community law, the national law would be ruled unconstitutional.  In 1984, through its 
decision in the Granital128 case, the ICC disposed of the Constitutional review requirement 
for cases dealing with inconsistent national and Community laws, ruling that Community 
laws in which direct effect applies will prevail over national laws. The Court stressed that 
“… technically, national norms may not be abrogated by Community norms, nor are they to 
be considered null and void. They simply cannot be applied by judges – when the same 
concrete situation is governed by both a national and a Community norms, the former is no 
longer relevant to the case.”129  
In a parallel set of cases, the ICC has made adverse rulings on European integration, 
despite accepting aspects of Community supremacy, by focusing on the issue of limited 
sovereignty. In 1973, the ICC decided the Frontini130 case, holding that the States’ powers 
are limited due to handing over certain powers to the Community. However the ICC also 
held that Community institutions are incapable of breaking fundamental constitutional 
principles because this would nullify the sovereignty of Italy and exceeds Constitutional 
limits. The ICC retained the ability to review Community law when it threatened Italian 
constitutional principles. More than a decade later, the ICC decided the FRAGD131 case 
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ruling on the constitutionality of the parliamentary act that ratified Article 177132 of the EC 
Treaty, specifically the section giving the ECJ the right to provide prospective judgments in 
preliminary proceedings. The ICC held that all Treaty provisions were subject to judicial 
review to determine their constitutionality, expanding its right to review Treaty provisions 
and secondary law.133 The ICC reasoned that a “judgment of unconstitutionality would not 
necessarily invalidate the entire ratification law but only some of the Treaty’s articles, 
interpretations, or applications. Under this line of reasoning, the Court attempts to 
eliminate from the Italian legal order those community rules which are inconsistent with 
the highest constitutional values, while preserving Italian membership in the EC.”134  
The ICC has theoretically accepted supremacy of Community law, but places a limit 
on further integration when sovereignty is in jeopardy. Reserving the right to review of 
Community norms is incompatible with the ECJ’s declaration of supremacy. The ECJ has 
sought to acquire and maintain the exclusive right to void and review Community law.135 
The ICC has repudiated the ECJs claim and the idea that Community law remains supreme 
over national laws by maintaining the right to potentially invalid elements of Treaty 
provisions should they conflict with constitutional law. By subjecting Community law to 
constitutional review, the ICC has removed some of the hierarchical nature of a federal 
institution.  
France 
Like Italy, French courts also maintain the right to subject EU law to judicial review, 
albeit through a different process. France’s situation is unique, because it consists of high 
courts that conflict over the position of supranational law in the national courts. France’s 
legal system consists of the Cour de Cassation, the Conseil Constitutional and the Conseil 
                                                          
132 Article 177 reads: 1.Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation, which shall be complementary to the 
policies pursued by the Member States, shall foster: the sustainable economic and social development of the developing 
countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them; the smooth and gradual integration of the 
developing countries into the world economy; the campaign against poverty in the developing countries. 2. Community 
policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, 
and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
3. The Community and the Member States shall comply with the commitments and take account of the objectives they 
have approved in the context of the United Nations and other competent international organizations. 
133 Id at 9 
134 Cartabia, 186 
135 Backer, 205 
Page 45 of 74 
 
d’Etat. The Cour de Cassation is the highest judicial court and exercises jurisdiction as the 
court of last resort for civil and criminal matters, and is the most accepting of Community 
supremacy. The Conseil Constitutionnel acts as the supreme authority on constitutional 
matters and the Conseil d’Etat is the highest administrative court. Both courts have been 
far more suspicious of Community law and have historically treated Community law as 
international law, maintaining that supremacy of the French Constitution over Community 
norms.  
 Article 61 of the 1958 French constitution requires institutional acts be referred to 
Conseil Constituionnel for a rule on their conformity with the constitution.136  In 2008, this 
provision was amended,137 to grant individuals facing a court the right to argue that a 
legislative provision is in breach of rights afforded by the constitution, a process known as 
QPC.138 Procedurally, once invoked, the respective court must pause the proceedings while 
the question is examined by the Conseil d’état or the Cour de Cassation. These courts then 
decide whether to refer it to the Conseil Constitutionnel for a final ruling. If the Conseil 
Constitutionnel finds the provision is in breach of the Constitution, the provision is 
repealed. A preliminary understanding of the QPC process reveals potential concerns for 
the ECJ, as subjecting national implementing law to constitutional review once again defies 
the notion of the supremacy of Community law.  
The Cour de Cassation was the first French high court to readily accept Community 
law. The leading case for the Cour de Cassation is Administration des Douanes v. Societe 
‘Cafes Jacques Vabre’ et SARL Weigel et Cie139, under which the Cour held that when a 
conflict exists between a national law and an appropriately ratified international act that 
had entered the internal legal order, the Constitution granted priority to the international 
act. Vabre imported soluble coffee extract into France from Holland on which he was 
required to pay duties under a 1996 French law. Because coffee extract produced in France 
was subject to a lower tax rate, the complainant argued it that had violated Community law. 
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In response, the Director-General of Customs argued that the Cour de Cassation is 
precluded from determining constitutionality because that right is reserved for the Cour 
d’Appel. The Cour de Cassation rejected this argument, reasoning that the Community 
operates on a separate legal order to which national courts are bound.  
In the case of Melki and Abdeli, two unlawfully present Algerian nationals were 
detained by French police at a police control zone close to the French-Belgian border. They 
argued that the law permitting the police controls breached their rights guaranteed by the 
French constitution. By invoking article 88-1 of the French Constitution, which recognizes 
France’s participation in the EU, they argued that the treaty provision that allows for free 
movement of persons has constitutional value and that the police controls violated France’s 
constitution.  
The Cour de Cassation found that in order to make a decision on constitutionality, 
the Conseil Constitutionnel would have to subject Community laws to constitutional review 
in order to decide on the compatibility of the police control provision with EU law. It 
requested a preliminary ruling from the ECJ for guidance on whether France’s law 
permitting police controls violated France’s constitutionally mandated EU participation.140 
The first president of the Cour de Cassation, Vincent Lamanda, referencing Simmenthal 
stated that “every national court must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply [EU] law in its 
entirety and protect rights, which the latter confers on individuals, and must accordingly 
set aside any provision of national laws which may conflict with it, whether prior or 
subsequent to the [EU] law.”141 The ECJ’s preliminary ruling suggested that the Cour repeal 
the national law. 
The Conseil Constitutionnel has consistently held that it is of utmost importance 
that the French Constitution remains supreme to Community law. In 1996, the president of 
the Conseil Constitutionnel, Pierre Mazeaud, wrote, “It is necessary to amend the Treaty of 
Rome itself to insert into it an exception to the supremacy of Community law when the 
latter infringes the constitution of one of the Member States. When the Court of Justice 
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finds that a Community act is contrary to a constitutional rule or principle in a Member 
State, it should exempt that state from applying it within its territory.”142 The Conseil 
Constitutionnel has held that directives must not be contrary to a rule or principle inherent 
in the French constitutional identity, unless the people of France have consented.143 The 
Conseil Constitutionnel disagreed with the Cour de Cassation’s decision in the Melki case. 
The Conseil Constitutionnel disagreed that article 88-1 required legislation be examined in 
light of all EU law. The Conseil proclaimed that the QPC procedure “did not hinder a court 
from doing whatever was necessary to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law in a case 
before it when it is alleged that national law is in breach of EU law. The Conseil 
Constitutionnel confirmed in its Maastricht decision that there are limits to France’s 
acceptance of supremacy. Its decision stated that France could transfer competence to an 
international organization, provided that it did not thereby violate the essential conditions 
for the exercise of national sovereignty, and provided that the international agreement did 
not contain clauses contradictory to the Constitution. A transfer of power that exceeds 
constitutional norms would require modification of the constitution.144 
Similarly, the Conseil d’Etat departed from the Cour de Cassation’s reasoning. Two 
days after the Conseil Constitutionnel’s ruling, the Couseil d’Etat held in the Rujovic case 
that the loi organique did not hinder the administrative courts from ensuring the 
effectiveness of EU law as they can immediately stop all effects of a law which is contrary to 
EU law. The Conseil d’Etat also ruled that an administrative court must first examine 
whether “a rule of general principle exists in [EU] law which, having regard to its nature 
and scope, as interpreted by the current state of the CJEU (Court of Justice of the European 
Union)’s case law, guarantees in its application the effective respect of the provision or 
principle of constitutional value invoked.”  Following the path of the conseil 
Constitutionnel, the Conseil d’Etat recognized that there is “a core of constitutional values 
which would block the transposition by an administrative act, and it will undertake this 
control on a case-by-case basis.145  
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 The lack of a consensus amongst French courts highlights the disparity amongst and 
the debate between different national courts within a member state. France has one court 
that aligns itself with the European Court of Justice and two courts that seek to protect 
constitutional law over Community law. The Cour de Cassation envisions itself as a 
European Court, while the Conseil Constitutionnel and the Conseil d’Etat are loyal first and 
foremost to French constitutional principles. The Cour de Cassation does not draw its 
authority to apply EU law from the French Constitution, but looks directly to EU law. On the 
other hand, the Conseil d’Etat, in its Rujovic decision, stated that ‘the administrative courts 
were the ‘juge de droit commun de l’application du droit de l’Union europeenne,’146 and 
should thus, in all circumstances, ensure the effectiveness of EU law. However, for the 
Conseil d’Etat, in line with the Conseil Contitutionnel, the Constiuttion remains supreme, 
and EU law is accommodated within the French legal system because this is provided for by 
the Constitution itself.”147  
United Kingdom 
Like Italy, the United Kingdom has developed a dualist view regarding the 
relationship between international treaties and national law. International treaties, 
“though signed and ratified by the United Kingdom, are not part of the domestic law of the 
United Kingdom.”148 They must be incorporated domestically in an Act of Parliament to be 
enforceable at the domestic level. This contradicts the doctrines of supremacy and direct 
effect because an Act of Parliament incorporating Community law at the domestic level is 
vulnerable to a subsequent contradictory Act of Parliament. Further, Community norms 
subject to direct effect are supposed to become effective without implementing legislation. 
On this issue, in the case of McWhirter v Attorney General, Lord Denning stated,  “Because 
Britain has adopted a dualist approach to treaty implementation, the obligations of Britain 
under the various treaties of the European Union have no effect, as far as these Courts are 
concerned, until it is made an Act of Parliament. Once an Act of Parliament implements it, 
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these Courts must abide by the Act of Parliament. Until that day comes, we take no notice of 
it.”149  
The case of R. v. Secretary for Transport, ex p. Factortame Ltd.150 involved Spanish 
fishermen who claimed that the criteria for registration of vessels under the Merchant 
Shipping Act of 1998 were discriminatory and incompatible with the EC treaty. The parties 
agreed to submit the issue to a preliminary hearing with the ECJ. The question under 
consideration was the status of the Act while the Act was under consideration by the ECJ. 
When the House of Lords ruled that “there was no jurisdiction under English law to grant 
interim injunctions against the Crown,”151 the applicant claimed that this was a violation of 
Community law. The ECJ held in favor of the applicants, citing the necessity for full 
effectiveness of Community law. The case returned to the House of Lords to be considered 
in light of the ECJ’s preliminary ruling. This case took twelve years to come to a conclusion, 
where many of the issues were settled, but highlighted the UK’s issues with Community 
supremacy. In a later case, Lord Justice Laws ruled that "...there is nothing in the European 
Communities Act which allows the European Court, or any other institution of the EU, to 
touch or qualify the conditions of Parliament's legislative supremacy in the United 
Kingdom...That being so, the legislative and judicial institutions of the EU cannot intrude 
upon those conditions."152 
Spain 
 Article 9  of the Spanish constitution was created in anticipation of Spain’s eventual 
admission into the European Community. It reads: 
‘By means of an organic law, authorization may be granted for concluding treaties by which 
the exercise of powers derived from the Constitution shall be vested in an international 
organization or institution.’ 
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Backer notes that in the early 1990s, Spanish courts began questioning the constitutional 
supremacy of the treaties undergirding the European Union.153 In the Electoral Law 
Constitutionality Case,154 the Constitutional Court ruled that: 
From the date of its accession, the Kingdom of Spain has been bound by both the 
primary and secondary law of the European Community which, to quote the words 
of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, constitutes an independent 
legal order, integrated into the legal systems of the Member States and which their 
courts are bound to apply. However, this binding nature clearly does not signify 
that, by means of Article 93 of the Constitution, the norms of European Community 
law are endowed with constitutional rank and force.  
Spanish courts have held that legal supremacy and constitutional supremacy are distinct 
and that national constitutions may not be constrained by superior law. It distinguishes 
between the granting of certain sovereign rights to an institution like the EU, and the actual 
ownership of those powers. This notion was expanded upon in Asepesco Case155 in which 
the Court stated: where a constitutional complaint action is brought against an act of the 
public authorities, taken for the implementation of a provision of Community law, alleging 
the violation of a fundamental right, such an action falls within the jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court, quite independently of the action of whether or not the act at issue is 
lawful from the strict perspective of the Community legal order and without prejudice to 
the interpretive value with which the provision may be endowed by Article 10(2) of the 
Constitution.  
 Like other Member States, the Spanish Constitutional Court maintains that 
Community law does not rise to the level of Constitutional law. Judgment 28/1991 held 
that the conflict between a Community norm and domestic norm lacks constitutional 
relevance. Community membership “does not mean that because of Article 9  the norms of 
European Community Law have been given constitutional rank and force, nor does it imply 
that the occasional infraction of these norms by a Spanish provision necessarily entails at 
                                                          
153 Backer 205 
154 Case No. 28/91 Spanish Constitutional Court 14, 1991 
155 Case No 64/91, Spanish Constitutional Court (March 22, 1991) 
Page 51 of 74 
 
the same time an infringement of the aforementioned Article 9  of the Constitution.”156 The 
Spanish Constitutional Court will not exercise jurisdiction over Community law, but 
maintains the right to hear cases on implementing legislation. Further, Spanish national 
authorities are not ‘Community’ organs, even when applying Community law. National 
authorities are permanently tied to the Constitution.157 
Germany 
Compared to other Member States, Germany has been the most consistent in its 
opposition to the expansion of the European Court of Justice’s competencies.  The 
jurisprudence on the relationship between the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) 
and the European Court of Justice parallels many of the arguments made in the anti-bellum 
south – mainly that the European Union is an association of sovereign states and that 
Germany must resist the transfer of sovereign power to the European government.158 
Backer notes Germany’s skepticism towards a centralized union, arguing that “The German 
experience with federalism, as well as its horrible experience with a centralizing 
government between 1918 and 1945 have infused German courts viewing the growth of 
European federalism with a healthy dose of skepticism of the supremacy, hierarchy and 
hegemony of the general governments. Such governments have tended to be anti-
democratic and tyrannical.”159 One of the FCC’s foundational cases dealing with the 
relationship between the FCC and the ECJ is on the issue of fundamental human rights 
standards, a topic the Treaty of Rome ignores.160 Germany expressed concerns that the 
Community would disregard fundamental rights guaranteed by German Basic Law. In 
response U. Scheuner wrote: 
“When considerable parts of Community Law came to be regarded as directly 
applicable, demanding immediate application within the States, and when 
supremacy of Community Law was proclaimed by the Court, the question became 
urgent whether the transfer of powers to the Community … include[d] the 
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recognition of the primacy of European enactments even over norms of the 
[German] Federal Constitution.”161  
The 1974 Solange I case involved issues with the European Council and Commission 
Regulation that required payment of a bond in conjunction with export license 
applications. The applicant protested his forfeiture of a bond paid on a corn flour export 
transaction.  The respondent claimed that the applicant had violated its constitutional 
rights provided by Germany’s Basic Law. The Administrative Court referred the case for a 
preliminary ruling, arguing that German courts could not enforce Community regulations 
that conflict with fundamental rights that arise from the German Constitution as the 
German court maintains the obligation to protect fundamental liberties.  
 The ECJ ultimately ruled that the forfeiture of the bond was not an unreasonable 
burden of trade and that no fundamental right had been violated. However, it took serious 
issue with the Administrative Court’s argument, stating that: 
“Recourse to legal rules or concepts of national law to judge the validity of 
instruments promulgated by Community institutions would have the effect of 
harming the unity and efficacy of Community law. The validity of such instruments 
can only be judged in the light of Community law…Therefore the validity of the 
Community instrument or its effect within a member-State cannot be affected by 
allegations that it strikes at either the fundamental rights as formulated in that 
State’s constitution or the principles of a national constitutional structure.”162 
In response to the ECJ, the Administrative Court contested the ECJ’s description of the 
relationship between national and Community law: 
“The question is certainly justified as to whether a certain decline in national 
institutions and constitutionality must be suffered as the price for the construction 
of a political union of Europe… [I]f Community law…is given precedence over any 
divergent constitutional provisions, and this European legal system is exempt from 
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the obligations contained in…the [national] Constitution, it would lead to a 
constitutional and legal vacuum.”163 
The Administrative Court argued that national law should be the highest national check on 
European legislation. The FCC was worried about increased expansion without legal 
safeguards. The FCC subsequently commenced a review of its concerns, commenting on the 
EU’s democracy deficit, stating that: 
In this [connection], the present state of integration of the Community is of crucial 
importance. The Community still lacks a democratically legitimated parliament 
directly elected by general suffrage which possesses legislative powers and to which 
the Community organs empowered to legislate are fully responsible on a political 
level; it still lacks in particular a codified catalogue of fundamental rights, the 
substance of which is reliable and unambiguously fixed for the future in the same 
way as the substance of the [national] Constitution and therefore allows a 
comparison and a decision as to whether, at the time in question, the Community 
law standard with regard  to fundamental rights generally binding in the 
Community as adequate in the long term measured by the standard of the 
Constitution with regard to fundamental rights…164 
The Court essentially held that the Community, at that time, lacked the ability to guarantee 
the protection of German constitutional rights. The FCC further reasoned that the German 
legislature, in assenting to the EEC treaty, could not have intended to transfer powers to 
the Community that would infringe upon the German Constitution. The FCC maintained 
that it must continue to exercise its authority to protect Germany’s Basic Law. The FCC’s 
insistence on the need to protect Basic Law was met with substantial criticism from EU 
institutions. The Commission of the European Communities stated that: 
This ruling is contrary to Community law – and in particular to the principle of its 
autonomy and its primacy over national law, including constitutional law – and to all 
the relevant case law of the European Court. Accordingly it is a dangerous threat to 
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the unity of Community law and creates uncertainty as to the latter’s uniform 
application. By claiming the power to verify the compatibility of Community 
secondary legislation with the fundamental rights in the Basic Law, the 
Constitutional Court is impugning the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to 
ensure that in the interpretation and application of the treaties the law is 
observed…165 
Solange I remained in place for twelve years, until the FCC’s decision in Solange II. In 
1976, a German processed-food importer was denied a license to import one thousand tons 
of Taiwanese canned mushrooms into Germany. The license was denied due to EEC 
Community Regulations that were in effect at that time. The importer filed a complaint with 
the Administrative Court, alleging that the EEC regulations were invalid because they were 
premised on poor market conditions that no longer existed. The complainant argued, “As 
temporary protective measures, the regulation had lost their basis in fact and, therefore, in 
law.”166 The Administrative Court held that the EEC regulation was consistent with the 
Treaty of Rome and sought a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice. The 
complainant re-stated its argument on the invalidity of the regulation due to the change in 
the market. The ECJ decided against the complainant, holding that the information 
available at the time did not warrant a repeal of protective measures.  
When the case returned to the Federal Administrative Court, the complainant 
alleged a myriad of claims against the ECJ, including that the ECJ had usurped the function 
of the national court by making factual determinations, and that his constitutional right to 
practice his trade had been violated. The complainant requested a hearing in front of the 
FCC or, in the alternative, to renew his appeal to the ECJ. The Administrative Court rejected 
both requests. In response, the complainant filed a constitutional complaint with the FCC 
against the Federal Administrative Court. The FCC found that fundamental rights in the 
Community had now risen to a level of fundamental rights protection that was required by 
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the German Constitution. A conflict between Community law and German law would no 
longer result in German law automatically superseding Community law.167 
Prior to Solange II, the FCC limited its jurisdiction to cases reviewing acts of German 
state power. However, in this case, the FCC asserted jurisdiction over acts of European 
organs, reasoning that acts of the Union affect the fundamental rights of German citizens.168 
As such, the FCC challenged the authority of the ECJ by subjecting the acts of European 
organs to its jurisdiction. The Court reinstated its position that there was a limit to the 
amount of power that could be transferred from Germany to the European Union. Although 
the complainant argued that any transfer of power to the European Union violated the 
Constitution, the Court maintained that the Basic Law provided for Germany’s participation 
in the European Union.  
In its Maastricht decision, which was a challenge to the Treaty on European Union, 
the FCC introduced the issue of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, otherwise known as interpretive 
competence. The case asked whether the ECJ or the FCC holds the ultimate authority on the 
limits of EU competencies. The FCC confirmed its ruling in Solange II, but added that the 
FCC’s jurisdiction applies not only in cases where Germany is applying Community law, but 
also where Community law stands on its own. The FCC expressed concerns about the ECJ 
acting beyond its delegated competencies, and differentiated between treaty amendment 
and treaty interpretation. The Court held that the ECJ may engage in treaty interpretation, 
but not when it rises to the level of treaty amendment. Only the Member States, acting 
unanimously could engage in treaty amendment. Accordingly, “the Federal Constitutional 
Court will review legal instruments of the European institutions and agencies to see 
whether they remain within the limits of the sovereign rights conferred on them or 
transgress them.”169 Once again, the FCC ruled that Community law is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. 
The FCC raised the EU’s democracy deficit issue. One of the core principles of 
Germany’s Basic Law is its Democracy Principle and the status of democratic legitimation. 
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The complainant asserted that the Maastricht Treaty violated its constitutional right 
granted by article 38(1) which provides: “( )The deputies to the German Bundestag shall 
be elected in general, direct, free, equal and secret elections. They shall be representatives 
of the whole people, not bound by orders and instructions, and shall be subject only to their 
conscience.”170 Thus, it is the constitutional right of the citizens of Germany to elect 
members of the Bundestag, which satisfies the democratic legitimation requirement of the 
Democracy Principle. The FCC examined whether democratic features, which included the 
constant free exchange of ideas, transparent and understandable objectives of public 
authority, and the possibility for citizens to communicate in their native tongue with public 
authorities, were present in the EU.171 The Court found that the EU lacked a democratic 
infrastructure. Although the European Parliament played a democratic role in the EU, it 
was described as peripheral and supportive. Meanwhile, the European Council, which 
exercises real power throughout the EU, is not a popularly elected body and its decisions 
are not transparent. Democratic legitimacy, according to the FCC, comes from the elected 
bodies of the Member States. Transferring too much power to the European Union would 
result in granting too many competencies to an institution with indirect legitimacy and 
would violate the Democracy Principle.  
The most recent case of significance from the German Federal Constitutional Court 
is the Lisbon case, decided 30 June 2009.172 The subject matter concerned the ratification of 
the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community. The complaint also challenged the German Act Approving the 
Treaty of Lisbon.  The primary issue in the Treaty of Lisbon was the new procedure for 
amending European Treaties and the ‘bridging clauses’ “pursuant to which the Member 
State governments will be able to give up their veto in the Council and move to qualified 
majority voting on certain matters without particular treaty amendments requiring 
ratification by the Member States.”173 The Court found that the legislative bodies (the 
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Bundestag and the Bundestrat) had not been afforded sufficient participation in matters 
leading to the transfer of greater powers to the European Union Institutions.174 The FCC 
based its ruling on principles of sovereignty, authority, and democratic theory, 
emphasizing “that Germany’s participation in European integration will be viewed through 
the lens of the constitution’s positions for international law.”175 Using Articles 38 and 23(1) 
as the legal foundation, the Court invoked models of electoral democracy and constitutional 
identity.  
The FCC spent a considerable amount of time outlining its understanding of the 
European framework.  First, its transformation into a political union as European Union in 
1992 with increased openness on issues like home affairs, foreign and security policies, and 
justice. Next, the expansion to twenty-seven Member States, which the FCC contended was 
at odds with the original intention of a deepening of a common political identity. Third, the 
failure of the European constitution. Finally, the continued commitment to Germany’s 
membership in the EU being subjected to the supervision of the German FCC.  
One of the key principles the FCC discussed in its decisions is that of an electoral 
democracy. Based on Article 38(1), the Constitution guarantees the right of German 
citizens to equally and freely determine public authority. The FCC explained that “The 
citizens’ right to determine in respect of persons and subjects, in freedom and equality by 
means of elections and other votes, public authority is the fundamental element of the 
principle of democracy. The right to free and equal participation in public authority is 
enshrined in human dignity (Article 1.1 of the Basic Law).”176 Thus the democratic 
principle is immutable and not only applies to the citizens of Germany, but rather it is a 
universal principle, applicable in every country. Pursuant to its previous ruling, the 
European Parliament, though the most democratic European institution, the EP is not a 
representative body of a sovereign European People.177 Parliamentary democracy is 
limited because the prescribed allocation of seats of Member States which, according to the 
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Treaty of Lisbon, distribution of seats is “degressively proportional.”178 Rather than being 
based on a specific formula, the 750 seats are allocated by negotiation, where 
proportionally, smaller states currently receive more places than more popular seats. Thus 
the FCC reasoned that it is not the “European people” who are represented, but rather the 
people of separate Member States, arguing that “The representation of the peoples in their 
respectively assigned national contingents of Members is not laid out as a body of 
representation for the citizens of the Union as undistinguished unity according to the 
principle of electoral equality.”179 
The FCC seamlessly links this principle with the constitutional identity principle, 
stating that democracy is not susceptible to the weighing of other legal interests. 
Democracy is paramount, and therefore the government must remain the masters of the 
treaties. If democracy is guaranteed, than not even parliament can tamper with the 
constitutional identity. The FCC solidified its position on the issue, stating, “The design of 
the European Union must comply with the principles of democracy. …Neither can the 
European integration lead to an erosion of the democratic system of government in 
Germany (a) nor can the supranational public authority in itself miss basic democratic 
requirements (b).” 
 It is evident from the case law that there are unsettled issues in the European Union. 
In the United States, judicial review, implied powers, and supremacy have been secured at 
the federal level. Although ECJ case law exemplifies the Court’s attempt to federalize and 
further integrate the European Union, the case law from the Member State courts remains 
an impediment towards further integration. As the EU continues to amend its governing 
documents, national courts continue to subject EU law and treaty provisions to national 
and constitutional review. This suggests there is a struggle between European institutions 
and the Member States over whether the locus of power remains within the Member States, 
or whether the Member States have transferred sufficient competencies to create a federal 
institution parallel to the United States. The ramifications for the Member State courts will 
be examined in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 4 Analysis and Conclusion 
The hypothesis of this paper is that the European Union will remain a collection of 
closely aligned but sovereign states, resembling the confederate ideals promulgated by 
John C. Calhoun and his fellow southern ante-bellum politicians. To test this, the previous 
chapters examined the American journey from a confederate union to a federalized nation, 
followed by the similar path taken by the EU through ECJ jurisprudence and the response 
by national courts in the Member States. This chapter engages in an analysis to determine 
whether the locus of power will remain with the Member States, or whether continuing 
integration will result in a ‘United States of Europe.’ One relevant factor revolves around 
the reserved powers of the Member States compared to those of the general government 
within the federal scheme, what are the ramifications of national courts subjecting EU law 
to judicial review, and whether the national courts can invalidate EU law, denying 
principles of Community supremacy.180 Another important factor discerns which court 
serves as the ultimate interpreter of EU law. If it is the ECJ, then this suggests that the locus 
of power sits at the supranational level. If it is the courts within the Member States, 
whether national or constitutional, then it must be that the locus of power remains with the 
Member States.  
 The ECJ is positioned in the middle of this argument, as it has been the Court that 
has transferred to itself an increasingly larger share of EU competencies. The EU is 
currently debating over many of the same issues debated in the pre-Civil War United States 
and it has similarly been the courts that have attempted to settle these debates. 
Understanding the foundations of the judicial policy making conducted by the United States 
Supreme Court creates the foundation for the examination of the European Court of 
Justice’s transformation into a powerful force for integration. As Henkel notes, “The Court 
is particularly responsible for the development and elaboration of the relationship between 
Community law and Member States and has delineated it much like the relationship in a 
constitutional federal State.” Accordingly, Calhoun’s political theory provides the 
foundational context for the Member States’, particularly Germany’s, response. It also 
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provides a re-characterization of federalism, which departs from what has become 
American orthodoxy. The cases examined in the previous chapter illustrated that the locus 
of power in the European Union remains with the Member States.  
Pierre Pescatore highlights the importance of federalism, observing, “The methods 
of federalism are not only a means of organizing states. Federalism is a political and legal 
philosophy, which adapts itself to all political contests on both the municipal and the 
international level, whenever and wherever two basic prerequisites are fulfilled: the search 
for unity, combined with genuine respect for the autonomy and the legitimate interests of 
the participant entities.”181 Backer explains that our current understanding of American 
federalism is based on the acceptance of several basic parameters. First, sovereign power is 
split between a national government and local political units, each of which constitutes an 
autonomous government. Second, within the domain of authority, the national government 
is supreme over state governments. Third, the power remains with the national 
government to decide the scope of the powers ceded to the national government meaning 
that the general government has discretion over which powers it delegates to itself. Fourth, 
the ceding of power creates a direct relationship between that national government and 
the people of the several states. Finally, secession from the union is impossible.182 These 
principles have been now been solidified throughout the United States and are no longer 
questioned.  However, as evidenced in Chapter 1, these principles were far from settled 
before the Civil War. Conversely, Daniel Elazar provides two possible ways to view a 
confederation: as a union of states each of which may be constructed in a statist fashion but 
which together have pooled certain powers for mutual advantage; or as in a union of 
unions in which sovereignty is vested in the people of each member unit and through them 
in the whole.183  
In 1991, the ECJ asserted its perception of what the EU had become. It argued that 
the EEC Treaty has transformed the Union into a community based on the rule of law 
where supremacy and direct effect established the essential characteristics of the 
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Community legal order and are applicable to the Member States and their nationals.184 This 
certainly resembles the federal system as it was in the United States during John Marshall’s 
time. Although supremacy and direct effect represent the ECJ’s attempts to federalize the 
EU and assert itself as the final arbiter of conflicts between national and Community law, 
these principles are subject to the most scrutiny in national and constitutional courts, thus 
making the ECJ vulnerable to the Member States.  
One of the major debates between federalists and anti-federalists was whether 
power derived from the people or from the states. Federalists like Alexander Hamilton, 
Justice Story and Justice Marshall championed the argument that the authority of the 
general government stems directly from the American people, citing the preamble of the US 
constitution, which starts with “we the people.” Federal institutions bind the people to their 
government. The confederates, particularly Judge Roane, argued that the Constitution was 
an agreement between the sovereign states, and that the general government serves as an 
agent of the states. In a confederacy, the people are protected by state governments, which 
in turn contract with other states to create a general government. The general government 
serves as a link between the states, but not the individuals. As proof, confederates cited the 
ratification process, which required each state to call its own convention.  Judge Roane 
deduced that because the national government was created by individual contracting 
powers, the national government constituted “an alliance, or league” of sovereign states.185 
Calhoun explained that the essential feature of the confederacy was “nearly allied to an 
assembly of diplomats”, meeting to determine certain policies, and then leaving their 
execution largely to the several parties to the agreement. As an agent to the Member States, 
it serves at their behest.   
The European Union’s authority is derived from the Member States, not the citizens 
within each Member State. As Judge Roane cited the preamble to the US Constitution, the 
preamble of the Treaty of Lisbon opens with His Majesty of the King of the Belgians, the 
President of the Republic of Bulgaria, the President of the Czech Republic ….Germany 
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reiterated these foundations in Maastricht, stating that “The Union Treaty establishes – as 
mentioned – an association of states for the realization of an ever closer union of the 
peoples of Europe (organized in the form of states), not a state based on a European 
people.”186 The FCC went on, stating that “in any case, establishing a United States of 
Europe with state status comparable to the United States of America is not currently 
intended.” Other national courts cited an ever-present duty to the people of their countries, 
most notably citing the issues of sovereignty and democracy. Explicit affirmations related 
to deepening integration of Europe suggest that national courts will continue to oppose any 
loss of state sovereignty, and that authority emanates from the Member States, not the 
European people.  
One of the key features of a federation under the American understanding, and 
Backer’s second requirement, is the hierarchical nature where lower governments must 
conform to the general government. In a federation, state law cannot contravene federal 
law. This was accomplished in the United States by the Supremacy Clause, which ensures 
that federal law is the supreme law of the land and the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
prevents any law from abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States, and the Martin v Hunters Lessee and McCulloch v Madison cases. In the EU, the Costa 
case established the supremacy of Community law over national law. However, despite its 
establishment in 1964, the doctrine of supremacy remains one of the most contentious 
issues in the EU, and one of the major impediments to forming a deeper union. National 
courts’ rulings on the conflicts between Community law and constitutional laws pose a 
significant threat to the supremacy of Community law. Some national and constitutional 
courts have placed limits on how far the state can go in accepting Community supremacy, 
especially if a treaty provision or Community norm conflicts with a state’s constitution. 
While some states have ruled that when a conflict exists, the national law must be amended 
to bring the state in line with the Community, others have gone so far to say that 
Community acts that are inconsistent with constitutional norms are void within that state. 
The German FCC ruled that the German constitution remains supreme in its Solange I, 
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Maastricht, and Lisbon cases. The Italian constitutional court ruled similarly in its Frontini 
and Simmenthal decisions.  
Perhaps one of the most poignant indicators of the locus of power, however, is the 
right to subject ‘higher’ law to judicial review. Similarly, which court serves as the ultimate 
interpretive authority? In the United States, state courts are precluded from engaging in 
judicial review of federal laws and the Supreme Court interprets its own jurisdiction, which 
suggests that the locus of power is at the federal level. This issue is far less concrete in the 
European Union. Member states are far from unanimous on these issues. Which court 
decides when the Community law and the European Institutions have exceeded the powers 
transferred to them? Which court serves has the ultimate interpreter of EU Acts? Despite 
the principle of direct effect, national courts have held that Community law remains subject 
to judicial review by the constitutional or national courts. The ante-bellum confederates’ 
argument becomes especially relevant. Confederates argued that state courts have the right 
to review federal laws for constitutionality, and a state court can invalidate a federal law if 
the court holds that the federal law exceeds its jurisdiction. Under Calhoun’s nullification 
theory, a state may reject a measure of the general government regarded as inconsistent 
with the terms of the constitution, thus nullifying a proposed action of the federal 
government. The German Federal Constitutional Court, making arguments most 
reminiscent of Calhoun’s, has led the way in arguing for judicial review of Community laws, 
but the courts in Italy, the UK, Spain, and France have also maintained that Community law 
must not violate their respective constitution principles.  In the Maastricht case, the FCC 
held that it is the Member States that maintain the authority to assess the validity of 
Community Institutions. For example, in its Maastricht decision, the FCC ruled that: 
What is decisive is that Germany's membership and the rights and duties that follow 
there from (and especially the immediately binding legal effect within the national sphere 
of the Communities' actions) have been defined in the Treaty so as to be predictable for the 
legislature and are enacted by it in the Act of Accession with sufficient certainty. That also 
means that subsequent important alterations to the integration programme set up in the 
Union Treaty and to the Union's powers of action are no longer covered by the Act of 
Accession to the present Treaty. Thus, if European institutions or agencies were to treat or 
Page 64 of 74 
 
develop the Union Treaty in a way that was no longer covered by the Treaty in the form 
that is the basis for the Act of Accession, the resultant legislative instruments would not be 
legally binding within the sphere of German sovereignty. The German state organs would 
be prevented for constitutional reasons from applying them in Germany. Accordingly the 
FCC will review legal instruments of European institutions and agencies to see whether 
they remain within the limits of the sovereign rights conferred on them or transgress them. 
This sentiment, that acts exhibited by European institutions that exceed the 
competencies granted to them by the Treaty are not legally binding in Germany, and that 
the FCC’s insistence on assessing the legal instruments to ensure they remain within the 
bounds of the conferred rights, defies the traditional understanding of federalism. It also 
defies the principles of supremacy and direct effect – the founding legal doctrines. 
Similarly, in Calhoun’s A discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States, 
Calhoun wrote: 
(O)n the contrary, if they have, by ratifying the constitution, divested themselves of 
their individuality and sovereignty, and merged themselves into one great 
community or nation, it is equally clear that the sovereignty would reside in the 
whole – or what is called the American people; and that allegiance and obedience 
would be due to them. Nor is it less so, that the government of the several states 
would, in such case, stand to that of the United States, in the relation of inferior and 
subordinate, to superior and paramount; and that the individuals of the several 
states, those fused, as it were, into one general mass, would be united socially, and 
not politically. So great a change of condition would have involved a thorough and 
radical revolution, both socially and politically – a revolution much more radical, 
indeed, than that which followed the Declaration of Independence.  
 
The fact that Member States continue to subject Community law to judicial review suggests 
that the locus of power remains with the Member States. Despite the ECJ’s insistence that 
Member States must implement Community law without question, the previously 
examined cases show that national courts, particularly those in Italy, France, and Germany, 
hold that national courts can review Community law for constitutionality. Requiring 
Community law to respect national Constitutional principles is the reverse of the example 
set by the United States, where state laws must conform to federal laws. Even if that 
authority remains theoretical, the notion that a national court is subjecting what is 
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supposedly a higher law to review suggests that the ultimate authority remains with the 
national and constitutional courts.   
State sovereignty is another issue that prevents the European Union from becoming 
a ‘United States of Europe’.  While in both the US and the EU the shared powers are 
delegated, the American re-definition of the locus of sovereignty stands in sharp contrast to 
the statist approach to sovereignty that animates Europe. In the EU, institutions struggle 
between the limited character of delegated powers and the statist ideals that normally 
accompany the assignment of competences in statist polities. Calhoun argued that although 
the general government acts as a sovereign entity, it is not actually sovereign. Acting as 
their agent, the national government merely exercises particular sovereign powers 
delegated to it by the sovereign states. The same can be said for the European Union. 
Member States have delegated to the European institutions the authority to exercise 
certain sovereign attributes, but ultimate authority remains in the member states. The 
German FCC, in its Maastricht decision, likened the TEU as nothing more than an 
international agreement among sovereign states. The Member States, the FCC stated, 
remain the Herren der Vertrage, the ‘lord of the treaty,’ and never surrendered their ability 
to secede. 187 
Europe’s democracy deficit is a major point of contention amongst scholars, and was 
one of the key arguments in Germany’s Maastricht and Lisbon decisions. Some have 
characterized it as a debate between direct and indirect legitimation where Union 
democracy is inaccessible to the ordinary citizen because their method of operating is so 
complex. Legislative and government powers are dominated by the European Council, the 
least democratic institution within the Union, thus arguing that the EU lacks democratic 
legitimacy.188 Traditional theory derives legitimacy from the notion that the process of 
European integration is guided and controlled by the sovereign and democratic Member 
States. National parliaments “ratify the treaties; democratically accountable heads of state 
or government meeting in the European Council set the strategic priorities; the Council of 
Ministers, composed of people who are normally elected members of the national 
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executives, must approve the Commission’s proposals before they become European law.” 
189 Some have argued that these are insufficient grounds of legitimation. In its Lisbon 
decision, the FCC reasoned that even if the European Parliament were to expand its 
competences, it would not fill the democracy gap between the decision making power of 
the Union’s institutions and the citizens’ democratic power of action in the Member States.  
“Measured against requirements placed on democracy in states, its election does not take 
due account of equality, and it is not competent to make authoritative decisions on political 
direction in the context of the supranational balancing of interests between the states…Due 
to this structural democratic deficit, which cannot be resolved in an association of 
sovereign national states (Staatenverbund), further steps of integration that go beyond the 
status quo may undermine neither the States’ political power of action nor the principle of 
conferral.”190 One of the most difficult challenges in securing legitimation, then, is 
reconciling the equality of states with the equality of citizens. As the EU is attempting to 
secure itself as a deeply integrated supranational union, democratic principles require that 
all citizens have equal rights. Europeans seem to be more worried about the ‘democratic 
deficit’ in the EU, an aspect of its statist bureaucratic character, than in improving the 
partnership, which is what concerns Americans, because the EU is a union founded on 
principles of economic liberalism and limited partnership.191 
The principles we have come to understand as paramount to a federal institution – 
supremacy, interpretive authority, implied powers, and democratic legitimacy have been 
re-examined in the European context.  Backer’s sentiment rings true, that federal systems 
are not required to adhere to the principle that the courts of the general governments 
should be vested with the sole or supreme authority to interpret basic laws giving rise to 
the federal system.192 The asymmetrical nature of the European Union shows sympathy 
towards a Calhounian concurrent majority, which emphasizes that the devolution of the 
locus of sovereignty from a centralized general government to the constituent states serves 
to better reflect the emerging European pattern.193 In the United States, great emphasis 
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was placed on the symmetrical relationship between the government as a whole and its 
constituent units, however asymmetry is considered a necessity in the EU.  Member states 
have resisted the supremacy of EU law over national law and have maintained the right to 
review Community norms. Within the EU, there is more room to renegotiate the allocation 
of powers through treaty amendment than there is in the United States. European 
integration has “brought to the forefront the complex possibilities for structuring federal 
unions which remain federal but which may neither duplicate each other precisely nor fall 
within a recognized category of governmental organization.” Its divergent nature has 
forced scholars to expand their understanding of federalism, past what we know as post- 
Civil War American federalism.  Taking into consideration all of the relevant elements 
discussed in this paper, it is fair to assume that the locus of power is currently with the 
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